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INTRODUCTION
In the much-awaited Club Resorts v. Van Breda' ("Van
Breda") decision, the Supreme Court of Canada has finally
clarified the test for assumed jurisdiction in Ontario-and by
extension, Canada in general. To be sure, the decision, which
straddles the boundaries of civil procedure and the conflict of
laws, is not quite as high-profile or "sexy" as others released this
term.2 However, it will have profound implications for foreign
defendants sued in Canada. "Foreign" in this context refers to
both defendants from outside the forum province and
defendants from outside the country.
The Supreme Court in Van Breda crafted a seemingly
simplistic approach to jurisdiction simpliciter which relies on
four presumptive factors. However, as they say, "the devil is in
the details"-and courts should expect years of protracted
battles aimed at defining the precise contours of the four
presumptive factors. While the long-term effect of Ian Breda
might be increased predictability for litigants, the short-term
effect will be increased litigation designed to untangle the Van
Breda factors. Not only do the presumptive factors themselves
1. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572 (Can.). The Supreme
Court's decision in Van Breda dealt with the appeals raised by both Van Breda and
Charron Estate v. Village Resorts Ltd., 2010 ONCA 84 (Can. Ont. C.A.). C oincidentally,
the appealing defendant in each lawsuit was the sarne operator of Cuban resorts, Club
Resorts Limited. At the dine the Court relcased Van Breda, it also released two other
decisions dealing with jurisdiction in defamation cases, Breeden v. Black. [2012] 1
S.C.R. 666 (Can.) and Editions Ecosociete Inc. v. Banro Corp., [2012] 1 S.C.R. 636
(Can.).
2. See, e.g., R. v. Tse, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.) (declaring unconstitutional the
emergency wiretap provision of the Criminal Code); S.L. v. Commission scolaire des
Chincs, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235 (Can.) (upholding school board's decision not to exempt
appellant's children fron an ethics and religious culture course on the basis that it
infringed freedom of conscience and religion); Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. PHS Cnty.
Servs. Soc'y, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (Can.) (ordering Minister of Health to grant an
excmption under Canada's drug laws to a safe-injection drug clinic).
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need untangling, the Court left many jurisdictional questions up
in the air: How does the real and substantial connection test
work in non-tort cases? How do the traditional jurisdictional
bases of consent and presence fit into the jurisdictional mix? Is
forum of necessity an appropriate basis for jurisdiction in light
of the constitutional dimension of the real and substantial
connection test? How does the test apply to the enforcement of
foreign judgments? The Court provided no guidance on these
critical issues.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the new Van Breda
approach to personal jurisdiction in Canada and to expose its
shortcomings. While the Court is to be commended on focusing
the real and substantial connection test on the factual
connections that exist between the forum and the litigation, the
manner in which it chose to implement this test is less than
ideal. In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada in Van Breda
may have too quickly discounted "fairness" in its valiant effort to
achieve "order." In Part II of this Article, I chronicle the journey
from Moguard to Muscutt to Van Breda in terms of the evolving
understanding of the real and substantial connection test. In
Part III, I outline the Supreme Court of Canada's new approach
to personal jurisdiction articulated in the Van Breda case. The
remainder of the Article serves as an opportunity to discuss and
deconstruct various aspects of the Van Breda decision. In Part IV,
I look at the new presumptive factors approach to jurisdiction.
In Part V, I examine the Supreme Court's discussion of the
forum non conveniens doctrine. In Part VI, I probe some of the
unanswered questions from Van Breda-in particular, the
relationship between the real and substantial connection test
and presence and consent as a basis of jurisdiction; the forum of
necessity doctrine; the implications of the newjurisdictional test
for enforcement; and the intersection between the new
presumptive factors framework and the Court Jurisdiction and
Proceedings Act ("CJPTA"). In Part VII, I briefly analyze the
Supreme Court's decisions in Black and Banro and what these
decisions might mean for libel tourism in Canada. Finally, in
Part VIII, I offer some concluding thoughts on the future of
personal jurisdiction in Canada.
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I. ON THE ROAD TO VAN BREDA
One cannot fully appreciate the Supreme Court's decision
in Van Breda without a rudimentary understanding of how the
issue of jurisdiction simpliciter came to occupy center stage at
the nation's highest court. In 1990, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided Morguard Investments v. De Savoye, arguably the
most important conflict of laws case in Canadian history.
Moiguard was fundamentally a case about inter-provincial
judgment enforcement, raising a seemingly discrete issue: under
what circumstances is a judgment rendered by one province
enforceable in another? Under then-existing standards, a
judgment issued by a court in one province was enforceable in
the courts of another only where the defendant had either
submitted to the jurisdiction of the originating forum or been
served with process there. In short, Canadian courts only
recognized "presence" and "consent" as legitimate juridical
bases of jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. The Supreme
Court in Morguard saw this approach as outmoded and ill-suited
to the realities of a modern Canadian federation. Accordingly, it
held that a court in one province should enforce a judgment
issued in another province in cases where there is a "real and
substantial connection" between the dispute and the provincial
forum. The real and substantial connection test was intended to
strike "a reasonable balance between the rights of the parties"
and to "afford[] some protection [to a defendant] against being
pursued in jurisdictions having little or no connection with the
transaction or the parties." 4
The holding in Morguard, however, extended far beyond
the judgment enforcement context. It has long been recognized
in the conflict of laws that jurisdiction for enforcement purposes
and personal jurisdiction are correlated. In the words of Justice
La Forest in Morguard, "the taking of jurisdiction by a court in
one province and its recognition in another must be viewed as
correlatives."a In setting out the real and substantial connection
test for judgment enforcement purposes, the Court in lorguard
also set out the test for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction
3. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.).
4. Id. at 1080.
5 Id. at 1079.
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over a defendant. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction on the "front-
end" is the same asjurisdiction on the "back-end." Thus, the test
for personal jurisdiction over ex juris defendants would be the
same as that which governed jurisdiction for enforcement
purposes-i.e., the real and substantial connection test.b
While the Supreme Court had created a useful moniker-
the real and substantial connection test-it had failed to
delineate the contours of the test. It emphasized what the test
was not (i.e., a mechanical counting of contacts or
connections),7 but it refrained from elaborating upon what the
test was. In Hunt v. T&N plc, the Supreme Court pronounced
the real and substantial connection test to be a "constitutional
imperative []." 8  However, courts were no closer to
understanding the content of the test than they had been after
Moiguard. For the next decade, courts struggled to give structure
to the ill-defined real and substantial connection test. For the
most part, courts used provincial service ex juris statutes as a
guide to the sorts of connections that were "real" and
"substantial" enough to support the assumption ofjurisdiction.9
Approximately a decade after Morguard was decided, the
Ontario Court of Appeal thought it fitting to define more
precisely the scope of the real and substantial connection test. In
Muscutt v. Courcelles, the Court of Appeal articulated a non-
exhaustive eight-part test that would govern the assumption of
jurisdiction over an exjuris defendant:
1) The connection between the forum and the plaintiffs
claim;
2) The connection between the forum and the defendant;
6. Muscutt v. Courcelles (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 577, para. 38 (Can. Ont. C.A.)
("Although Morguard dealt with the proper exercise of jurisdiction fron the
perspective of recognition and cnforceincnt, La Forest J. made it clear that precisely
the same real and substantial connection test applies to the assumption of jurisdiction
against an out-of-province defendant."). Note that Aluscutt was decided with four
companion cases. See Lcufkens v. Alba Tours Int'l Inc. (2002). 213 D.L.R. (4th) 614
(Can. Ont. C.A.); Lemmex v. Bernard (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 627 (Can. Ont. C.A.);
Sinclair v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 643 ((an.
Ont. CA.); Gajiraj v. DeBernardo (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 651 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
7. Hunt y. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 326 (Can.).
8. Id. at 324.
9. See, e.g., Duncan (Litig. Guardian) v. Neptunia (2001), 199 D.L.R. (4[h) 354
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.J.).
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3) Unfairness to the defendant in assuming jurisdiction;
4) Unfairness to the plaintiff in not assumingjurisdiction;
5) The involvement of other parties to the suit;
6) The court's willingness to recognize and enforce an
extra-provincial judgment rendered on the same
jurisdictional basis;
7) Whether the case is interprovincial or international in
nature: and
8) Comity and standards of jurisdiction, recognition and
enforcement prevailing elsewhere. ()
The Muscutt factors began to dominate jurisdictional
determinations both inside Ontario and out. Courts finally had
something concrete to hang their jurisdictional hats on, rather
than some seemingly nebulous sense of what constituted a real
and substantial connection.
However, in attempting to give flesh to the real and
substantial connection test, it seems that the Court of Appeal in
Muscutt overshot the mark. By 2007, strong critiques of the
MVIuscutt approach to jurisdiction began to emerge." These
critiques related to the conceptual underpinnings of the test,
the propriety of analyzing certain of the individual Muscutt
factors, as well as the implications of this particularjurisdictional
test for the administration of justice. The critiques were cogently
summarized by the Court of Appeal in its later decision in V an
Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd.:
1) the Muscutt test is too subjective and confers too much
discretion on motion judges;
10. Muscutt v. Courcelles (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 577, paras. 76-102 (Can. Ont.
C.A.). Additionally, the Court of Appeal in Aluscutt confirmed that provincial service ex
juris rules were "procedural in nature" and needed to be "read in the light of the
constitutional principles of 'order and fairness' and 'real and substantial connection.'
See id. paras. 48-49. As such, simply fitting within an enuncrated ground for service ex
juris was not conclusive of the existence of a real and substantial connection.
11. See generally Jean-Gabriel Castel, The Uncerainty Factor in Canadian Private
Lnternational Law. 52 MCGILL L.J. 555 (2007); Tanya J. Monestier, A "Real and
Substantial" Mess: The Law offurisdiction in Canada 33 QLENS L.J. 179 (2007); Joost
lon, Q.C & Elizabeth Edinger, The Chimra of the Real and Subs antial Connection Test,
38 U.B.C. L. RLV. 373 (2005). Note, however, that solme commentators were supportive
of the MWuscutt decision. See, e.g., Vaughan Black & Mat Brechtcl, Revising Muscut: The
Ontario Court ojAppeal Takes A other Look, 36 AVOC. Q. 35 (2009).
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2) the eight-part test is too complicated and too flexible and
therefore leads to inconsistent application;
3) there is too much overlap of the test for jurisdiction with
the test for forum conveniens:
4) a clearer, more black-letter test should be applied to
foster international trade and to avoid the cost and delay of
preliminary skirmishing overjurisdiction;
5) the Mluscutt test allows ill-defined fairness considerations
to trump order in an area of the law where order should
prevail;
6) the Muscutt framework, and especially the fairness factor,
is susceptible to forum shopping, threatening to cause an
influx of litigants to Ontario;
7) lack of predictability and certainty increases litigation
costs and jurisdictional motions can be used as dilatory
tactics to impede meritorious claims;
8) it is wrong to look to foreign court practice as a model
for appropriate assertion ofjurisdiction.'1
The Ontario Court of Appeal took the Van Breda case (and
its companion case, Charron) as an opportunity to re-visit and re-
configure the Muscutt test. Van Breda and Charron presented a
similar factual matrix to Muscutt claims for damages in Ontario
as a result of personal injuries sustained abroad1 At trial, the
motions judge in V'an Breda had found that Ontario should
assume jurisdiction over the out-of-province defendants under
the eight-pronged Muscutt test. On appeal, and without the
defendants raising the issue, the Court of Appeal sua sponte
directed that a five judge panel would reconsider the Muscutt
test. And reconsider the Muscutt test they did. In Van Breda, the
Court of Appeal changed both the framework for, and the
content of, the real and substantial connection test.
The Court of Appeal divided the jurisdictional inquiry into
a two-step (or arguably, three-step) analysis. First, the Court of
Appeal in Van Breda created a category-based presumption of a
real and substantial connection where the case fell under any of
12. Van Breda y. Village Resorts ltd., 2010 ONCA 84, para. 56 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
13. The main distinction is that in Muscutt, the personal injury claim arose in a
differnt province (Alberta), while in Van Breda and Charron, the clain arose in a
foreign country (Cuba).
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the subsections of Rule 17.02 of the Ontario Rules of Civil
Procedure,14 with the exception of Rule 17.02(h) ("damages
sustained in Ontario") and Rule 17.02(o) ("necessary or proper
party"). The presumption, however, would not prevent a
plaintiff from establishing a real and substantial connection in
other circumstances. Nor would the presumption preclude a
defendant from demonstrating that, notwithstanding that the
case falls within a presumptive category, the real and substantial
connection test is not satisfied. The second step of the Court of
Appeal's framework involved applying a newly formulated real
and substantial connection test in light of the presumption in
Step 1. According to the Court of Appeal, "the connection that
the plaintiffs claim has to the forum and the connection of the
defendant to the forum, respectively" would now constitute the
core of the real and substantial connection test.15 In other
words, the real and substantial connection test was to focus on
the factual connections between the dispute and the forum
(Muscutt factors 1 and 2). The remaining Mkuscutt factors (factors
3-8) would not be treated as independent factors in the real and
substantial connection analysis, but rather would serve as
"analytic tools" to assist the court in assessing the significance of
the connections between the forum, the claim and the
defendant.'"
The Court of Appeal in Van Breda emphasized that there
may be exceptional circumstances where the real and substantial
connection test is not satisfied, but where the assumption of
jurisdiction is nonetheless warranted. Consequently, the Court
of Appeal created an exception to the real and substantial
connection test whereby a plaintiff may nonetheless be able to
bring his claim against an ex juris defendant in Ontario despite
the forum's lack of connection to the dispute. Specifically,
where there is no other forum in which the plaintiff can
reasonably seek relief, Ontario may act as a "forum of necessity"
or "forum of last resort."17
Very shortly after the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered
the Van Breda decision, the Supreme Court of Canada granted
14. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 17.02 (Can.).
15. Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd., 2010 ON(A 84, para. 84 ((an. Ont. C.A.).
16. Id.
17. Id. para. 100.
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leave to appeal the decision. Litigators across Canada waited
with anticipation for the Supreme Court's definitive
pronouncement on jurisdiction simpliciter.18 The decision
would determine how easy, or how difficult, it would be for
plaintiffs to sue foreign defendants in Ontario (and by
extension, Canada). The decision was finally released in April
2012-and it was met not with a bang, but a whimper. In the
aftermath of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in V an
Breda, there was comparatively little academic and industry
commentary on the decision. Perhaps this is because nobody
knew quite what to make of the decision.0 This Article is
designed to comprehensively tackle the Supreme Court of
Canada's decision in Van Breda with a view to answering the
following question: Is the law of jurisdiction in Canada post-Van
Breda still a "real and substantial" mess?20
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONIN VAN BREDA
While the Supreme Court's decision in Ian Breda focused
primarily on the legal issues involved in establishing jurisdiction
simpliciter, it is important to understand the facts that gave rise
to the dispute. This is particularly so because the Supreme
Court's application of the law to the facts raises some serious
questions about the exact scope of the framework crafted by the
Court.
Van Breda and Charron both involved tragic facts. In Van
Breda, the plaintiff, Ms. Van Breda, and her partner, Mr. Berg,
booked a one-week vacation to the SuperClubs Breezes Jibacoa
18. See jeff Gray, Spine Broken on Vacation, Ioman's Lawsuit Tests Courts, GI.OBE &
MAIL (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.thcglobeandnail.com /report-on-busincss/industry-
news/ the-law-page/ spin e-broken-on-vacation-wonans-lawsuiit-tests-
courts/artick2008800 (noting that at least one major securities class action against
American International Group ("AIG") had been put on hold pending the Supreme
Court's determination of pivotal issue ofjurisdiction in Van Breda).
19. Several articles have recently been published on the Van Breda decision. See
Vaughan Black, Simplifing Court Jurisdiction in Canada, 8J. PRIVATL INT'L L. 411 (2012):
joost llon, New Ground RulesforfuJisdctional Dispute The Van Breda Quartet, 53 CAN.
BLs. L. J. 1 (2012); Brandon Kain, Elder C. Marques. & Byron Shaw, Developments in
Private International Law: The 2011-2012 Tern-The thfinished Project of the Van Breda
Trilogy (2012), 59 S.C.L.R. (2d) 277.
20. In iy 2007 article, A "Real and Substantial" Mess. I argued that the Court of
Appeal in Aluscutt had imuddied the law of jurisdicion simpliciterin Canada to tihe point
where it was in a state of disarray. See Monestier, supra note 11.
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resort in Cuba. Mr. Berg, a professional squash player, had
arranged the trip through Rene Denis, who operated a web-
based business in Ontario under the name Sport au Soleil. Mr.
Denis arranged bookings for squash, tennis, and aerobics
instructors who agreed to instruct guests at certain Caribbean
resorts for a few hours each day in exchange for accommodation
at the resorts. Mr. Denis had an arrangement with the defendant
Club Resorts to find instructors for resorts managed by Club
Resorts. In early June 2003, Ms. Van Breda and Mr. Berg
travelled from Toronto for a one-week stay at the SuperClubs
Breezes resort in Cuba. Shortly after arriving, the pair went to
the beach where Mr. Berg did some chin-ups using a tubular
metal apparatus. When Ms. Van Breda attempted to do chin-ups,
the apparatus collapsed, sending her to the ground and
collapsing on top of her. Ms. Van Breda was rendered a
paraplegic as a result of the accident. Because of her injury, Ms.
Van Breda and Mr. Berg did not return to Ontario as they had
intended; rather, they moved to British Columbia to be closer to
family.
The Charron case involved a similarly tragic event. Mr. and
Mrs. Charron planned an all-inclusive vacation to a Cuban
resort, Breezes Costa Verde, also managed by the defendant
Club Resorts. The couple booked the trip in Ontario through a
travel agency (Bel Air Travel Group Ltd.) that had
recommended a fixed-price vacation package from the tour
operator Hola Sun Holidays Ltd. The package at Breezes Costa
Verde that the Charrons had purchased through the travel
agency included scuba diving at the resort. The Charrons
arrived at the resort on February 8, 2002. Four days later, on
February 12, Mr. Charron died during a scuba dive organized by
the resort. The plaintiffs in both V an Breda and Charron initiated
suit against various defendants in Ontario. At issue in the
appeal, however, was jurisdiction over one particular
defendant-Club Resorts.
After a brief recitation of the facts of Van Breda and
Charron, Justice LeBel, writing for the unanimous court21
proceeded with the legal analysis of the relevant issues. He
21. Seven justices signed on to the judgments, though nine originally heard the
appeals. Justice Charron retired while the decisions were under reserve; Justice Binnic
did not participate in the judgments.
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began with a section on the "Nature and Scope of Private
International Law" Where he went to great lengths to clarify the
interplay between the constitutional dimension of the real and
substantial connection test and the conflict of laws/private
international law dimension of the test. In particular, he
clarified that the real and substantial connection test which
imposed territorial limits on adjudicative jurisdiction was distinct
from the real and substantial connection test as expressed in
conflicts rules. Justice LeBel elaborated:
From a constitutional standpoint, the Court has, by
developing tests such as the real and substantial connection
test, sought to limit the reach of provincial conflicts rules or
the assumption of jurisdiction by a province's courts.
However, this test does not dictate the content of conflicts
rules, which may vary from province to province. Nor does it
transform the whole field of private international law into
an area of constitutional law. In its constitutional sense, it
places limits on the reach of the jurisdiction of a province's
courts and on the application of provincial laws to
interprovincial or international situations. It also requires
that all Canadian courts recognize and enforce decisions
rendered by courts of the other Canadian provinces on the
basis of a proper assumption of jurisdiction. But it does not
establish the actual content of rules and principles of private
international law. nor does it require that those rules and
principles be uniform.
22. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 23 (Can.). Justice
LeBel also indicated that the source of a court's authority to adjudicate derives from
section 92 of the Constitution Act. See id. para. 31 ("With respect to the constitutional
principle. the territorial limits on provincial kgislative competence and on thc
authority of the courts of thc provinces derive from the text of S. 92 of the Constitution
Act. 186. These limits are, in essence, concerned with the legitimate exercise of state
power, be it legislative or adjudicative."). It is not clear whether this is corrct. See
JANLT WALKLR & JEAN-GABRIEL CASTLL CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAws 8.5, (6th ed.
2005) ("The preamble to the Canadian Constitution explains that at the time of
Confederation, it was expedient to provide for 'tc Constitution of thc Legislative
Authority in the Dominion' and to declare 'thc Nature of the Executive Governmint.'
There is no mention in the preamble of a similar need to provide for the Judiciary
Section 129 confirms that it was the intention of the founders that 'Except as oticrwise
provided by this Act ... all Courts of Civil ... Jurisdiction ... existing therein at the
Union ... [would] continue ... as if the Union had not been made; sub'ect
nevertheless' to authorized and applicable legislation. Accordingly, it seems unlikely,
despite tihe suggestions of some courts and commentators, [hat the adjudicatory
authority of Canada's superior courts can properly be said to be defined by the
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The Court stressed that it was necessary to remain mindful
of the distinction between the real and substantial connection
test as a constitutional principle and the same test as the
organizing principle of the conflict of laws. The Van Breda
decision involved the latter, i.e., the "elaboration of the 'real
and substantial' connection test as an appropriate common law
conflicts rule for the assumption of jurisdiction."23
The Court then proceeded to the heart of the judgment-
how to define the real and substantial connection test, for
conflict of laws purposes, in the tort context. Justice LeBel noted
the tension that existed between "a search for flexibility, which
is closely connected with concerns about fairness to individuals
engaged in litigation, and a desire to ensure greater
predictability and consistency in the institutional process for
resolution of conflict of laws issues related to the assumption
and exercise of jurisdiction." '24 He ultimately concluded that, to
the extent that there is a conflict between "justice and fairness,"
on the one hand, and "certainty and predictabilitv,"I on the
other, the former must yield to the latter.25
The Court then established a new framework for the
assumption of personal jurisdiction in tort cases in common law
Canada. First, a plaintiff must fit himself within one of four
presumptive connecting factors:
(a) The defendant is domiciled or resident in the province;
(b) The defendant carries on business in the province;
(c) The tort was committed in the province;
(d) A contract connected with the dispute was made in the
province. 26
This list of presumptive factors, however, is not closed.
According to the Court, "[o]ver time, courts may identify new
factors which also presumptively entitle a court to assume
territorial limits on provincial legislative authority found in section 92 of the
Constitution because the Constitution does not grant the judicial authority of the
superior courts, as it does the lkgislative and executive authority exercised by the
federal and provincial governments. but micrely continues it.").
23. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 34 (Can.).
24. Id. para. 66.
25. Id. para. 73.
26. Id. para. 90.
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jurisdiction."2 7 In formulating new connecting factors, courts
should look for connections that give rise to relationships that
are similar to the four presumptive connecting factors. Relevant
considerations include:
(a) Similarity of the connecting factor with the recognized
presumptive connecting factors;
(b) Treatment of the connecting factor in the case law;
(c) Treatment of the connecting factor in statute law; and
(d) Treatment of the connecting factor in the private
international law of other legal systems with a shared
commitment to order, fairness and comity.28
The Court emphasized that where no presumptive factor
(whether listed or new) applies, a court should not assume
jurisdiction. Specifically, "a court should not assume jurisdiction
on the basis of the combined effect of a number of non-
presumptive connecting factors."29 This would open the door to
case-by-case determinations of jurisdiction, which would
undermine the order and predictability that the new test is
designed to foster.
Once a plaintiff has established that a presumptive factor
applies, the onus shifts to the defendant to rebut the
presumption of a real and substantial connection. The
defendant can rebut the presumption by showing that the
"presumptive factor does not point to any real relationship
between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum or
points only to a weak relationship between them."so If a
defendant is able to rebut the presumption, then jurisdiction
simpliciter has not been established and a court may not hear
the case.
here a real and substantial connection has been
established, a court may then consider a defendant's application
to stay a proceeding on the basis of forum non conveniens. A
clear distinction, however, must be drawn between jurisdiction
simpliciter and forum non conveniens; the latter comes into
play only after jurisdiction is established. The Court emphasized
27. Id. para. 91.
28. Id.
29. Id. para. 93.
30. Id. para. 95.
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that the forum non conveniens doctrine requires the defendant
to establish that the alternative forum proposed is clearly more
appropriate than the domestic forum. Where another forum is
only marginally more appropriate, a motion for a stay of
proceedings should be denied. In this regard, Justice LeBel
stated, " [i] t is not a matter of flipping a coin."'I Relevant factors
in the forum non conveniens inquiry might include "the
locations of parties and witnesses, the cost of transferring the
case to another jurisdiction or of declining the stay, the impact
of a transfer on the conduct of the litigation or on related or
parallel proceedings, the possibility of conflicting judgments,
problems related to the recognition and enforcement of
judgments, and the relative strengths of the connections of the
two parties."3, The Court expressed concern about reliance on a
loss of juridical advantage in the forum non conveniens inquiry;
the Court noted that to use this factor too extensively (at least in
the interprovincial context) might undermine the spirit of
Alorguard and Hunt. The Court stated that differences between
laws should not be "viewed instinctively as signs of disadvantage
or inferiority" and thus, a court should "refrain from leaning
too instinctively in favour of its own jurisdiction."-"
After laying out the new framework for the assumption of
jurisdiction, the Court then proceeded to apply the law to the
facts of both Van Breda and Charron. The Court concluded that
V'an Breda could be resolved on the basis that a contract related
to the tort action was entered into in Ontario. The Court stated
that " [t] he events that gave rise to the claim flowed from the
relationship created by the contract. " It further noted that
Club Resorts had not rebutted the presumption of jurisdiction
that arises from the application of this presumptive factor, nor
had it shown that there was another forum that was clearly more
appropriate than Ontario for the resolution of the action. With
respect to Charron, the Court held that the facts supported the
conclusion that Club Resorts was "carrying on business" in
Ontario, a presumptive connecting factor. It pointed to the fact
that Club Resorts' commercial activities in Ontario went beyond
31. Id. para. 109.
32. Id. para. 110.
33. Id. para. 112.
34. Id. para. 117.
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simply promoting a brand and advertising. Rather, Club Resorts'
representatives were in the province regularly and Club Resorts
benefitted from the physical presence of an office in Ontario.
The Supreme Court held that Club Resorts had not rebutted the
presumption of jurisdiction that arises from the "carrying on
business" connecting factor and that it failed to show that a
Cuban court would be a clearly more appropriate forum than
the domestic forum in the circumstances of this case.
III. THE PRESUMPTIVE FACTORS FRAMEWORK FOR
JUR ISDICTION
I have previously argued that the real and substantial
connection test, properly understood, should focus on objective
connections between the litigation and the parties. As such, I
critiqued both the Court of Appeal's decision in MVuscutt and its
decision in Van Breda as being too subjective, inconsistent in
application, and divorced from the core of the "connections"
that should be at the heart of the jurisdictional inquiry. In this
regard, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Van Breda is
an improvement over its predecessors.
The Supreme Court in Van Breda accepted the premise
that, to the extent that "fairness" and "order" cannot be
reconciled, the latter must prevail.35 Justice LeBel noted that
although fairness and justice are essential aspects of a sound
system of private international law, they cannot be attained
without a system of rules that ensures security and predictability.
As such, the "framework for the assumption of jurisdiction
cannot be an unstable, ad hoc system made up 'on the fly' on a
case-by-case basis."6 This is undoubtedly true. Past Supreme
Court precedent suggested that the real and substantial
connection test was not intended to be an all-encompassing
fairness inquiry. Rather, the test was intended to provide
objective limits on a court's adjudicative power, such that the
assumption of jurisdiction over exjuris defendants would be fair
and reasonable. Fairness was thus the goal of the real and
substantial connection test; it was not intended to define (in
part) the content of the real and substantial connection test.
35. Id. paras. 73-74.
36. Id. para. 73.
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Accordingly, the Court in Van Breda appropriately re-
oriented the real and substantial connection test toward the
"connections" that exist between the forum and the parties.
This point is made repeatedly in the judgment. For instance,
Justice LeBel posited that in order to foster stability and
predictability in private international law, the inquiry "should
turn primarily on the identification of objective factors that
might link a legal situation or the subject matter of the litigation
to the court that is seized of it." 1 He further stated that the
focus should be on the "factors or factual situations that link the
subject matter of the litigation and the defendant to the
forum."" Justice LeBel repeated that " [j]urisdiction must ... be
established primarily on the basis of objective factors that
connect the legal situation or the subject matter of the litigation
with the forum."" He also clarified that the general principles of
"fairness, efficiency or comity"-while important systemic
values-should not be confused with the objective factual
connections that are necessary to ground jurisdiction. 40
It is clear that the Supreme Court has recalibrated the real
and substantial connection test so as to focus on the objective
factual connections between the forum and the subject matter
of the litigation. It is a positive development that the objective
connections that link a dispute to the forum are now the
touchstone of the jurisdictional inquiry. In theory, this should
result in increased predictability for litigants, who will no longer
be forced to re-litigate jurisdictional determinations from first
principles. 41 Under the approach that prevailed under Muscutt
37. Id. para. 75.
38. Id. para. 79. The forinmulation here is slightly different, in that it looks at the
connection of both the subject matter of thc litigation and the defendant to thc forun.
This is reminiscent of debates post-Morguard as to whether the requisite connection was
between the forun and the defendant or thc forum and the subject matter of the
litigation. See generally Garry Watson & Frank Au. Constitutional Limits on Serice ExJuris:
Unanswered Quetionsfrom Morguard, 23 Avoc. Q. 167 (2000).
39. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 82 (Can.).
40. Id. para. 84.
41. Counsel for the defendant in Van Breda submits, "The Van Breda decision is a
inarked departure fromt the Muscutt test and represents a significant step forward in
providing predictability in this area of the law. It retmves a large element of discretion
that motion judges had under the rubric of unfairness to the litigants under the
Muscutt test. The Van Breda test should provide greater certainty and predicability for
litgatlLs in the future." John Olah & Roman Myndiuk, Unlocking the Msteries of
Jursdiction: The Van Breda Case, BEARD WINTER 1.1. (June 15, 2012), available at
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(and, to a lesser extent, the approach endorsed by the Court of
Appeal in Van Breda), litigants engaged in jurisdictional battles
as though this were the first time that a case like this had ever
been heard. Since subjective considerations unique to the
parties were part of the jurisdictional test (e.g., financial
resources, personal hardship, travel considerations, etc.), no two
cases were ever sufficiently alike to make jurisdictional
determinations predictable. Under the Supreme Court of
Canada's approach, the focus on objective connections should
provide some measure of stability and certainty in jurisdictional
determinations-at least in comparison to a fluid,
fairness/comity/efficiency based test.
With that said, the manner in which the Supreme Court
chose to implement the new connection-based test leaves much
to be desired. The Court created a rigid presumptive factors
approach whereby a court can only assume jurisdiction if the
plaintiff can fit himself within one of the four pre-determined
factors. In this respect, the Supreme Court has arguably still not
found the right balance between "order" and "fairness."
Whereas the Court of Appeal in Muscutt seemed to sacrifice
order at the altar of fairness, the Supreme Court in Van Breda
has done the opposite.
In this section, I examine more closely the four
presumptive factors and identify what is problematic about each
one. I also argue that while the Court emphasized that these are
rebuttable presumptions, the reality is that defendants will
rarely, if ever, be able to rebut the presumptions. As such,
plaintiffs who can fit themselves within one of the presumptive
factors will almost certainly be able to establish a real and
substantial connection between the forum and the dispute.
Further, I comment on the Court's invitation for courts to create
new presumptive factors and its warning not to aggregate non-
presumptive factors for the purposes of establishing a real and
substantial connection. Finally, I critique the presumptive
factors framework as being too tort-focused and providing no





A. The Four Presurptive Factors
As described, the Supreme Court reoriented the
jurisdictional test to focus on the objective factors which link the
forum to the subject matter of the dispute. It thought the best
way to do this was to rely "on a basic list of factors that is drawn
at first from past experience in the conflict of laws system and is
then updated as the needs for the system evolve."42 Accordingly,
the Court identified the following as presumptive connecting
factors that prima facie entitle a court to assume jurisdiction
over a dispute: a) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the
province; b) the defendant carries on business in the province;
c) the tort was committed in the province; d) a contract
connected with the dispute was made in the province. At first
blush, these appear to be fairly straightforward objective factors
linking the forum with the dispute. Upon closer analysis,
however, most of these factors leave a fair degree of interpretive
gaps and wiggle-room. Each of these factors will be discussed in
turn.
1. Defendant is Domiciled or Resident in the Province
The Court stated that "a defendant may always be sued in a
court of the jurisdiction in which he or she is domiciled or
resident (in the case of a legal person, the location of its head
office) ."4 This is hardly controversial. Indeed, most countries
regard the domicile or residence of the defendant as a ground
for general jurisdiction. What is surprising is the Court's
throwaway statement in parentheticals-i.e., "in the case of a
legal person, the location of its head office."4 4 Apparently, the
Court was saying that the domicile of a corporation for
jurisdictional purposes is the location of its head office (as
opposed to, say, its place of incorporation).45
42. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 82 (Can.).
43. Id. para. 86.
44. Id.
45. Black discusses the issue of domicile at some kngth stating, "However,
although residence of the defendant is not a surprising factor to see in such a list,
domicile is. Those familiar with the Brussels/Lugano regimes, where the defendant's
domicile in the formn is a general ground of jurisdiction, will not find it so. In Europe,
however, domicile is established in a commnonsense fashion, closely akin to residence.
In common law Canada, however, domicile remains afflicted by the interpretation
2013] 4 13
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However, the presumptive factor enunciated by the Court
referred to either the defendant's domicile or the defendant's
place of residence. These may be, but are not necessarily, co-
extensive. It is possible that a corporation may be resident in
multiple forums. Indeed, the CJPTA 46 specifically has a section
on "Ordinary residence-corporations" where there are four
different permutations of where a corporation can be ordinarily
resident.4  Similarly, Article 3148 of the Qudbec Civil Code
contemplates a distinction between domicile and residence.48 It
would have been helpful for the Court to clarify in a little more
detail when a legal person falls within the purview of this
presumptive factor. The Court's reasoning would seem to imply
that it is only when the entity's head office is located in the
forum. However, given that the presumption involves
accorded to it in a series of nineteenth-century English decisions. . . . LeBel j's
statement that domicile should now play a rolk in personal jurisdiction is the first new
use of that once ubiquitous connecting factor in decades." Black, supra note 19, at 422-
23.
46. The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act ("CIPTA") is a Uniform Act
promulgated by the Uniform Law Conference of ( anada. The Act, or a vanation
thereof, has been adopted in several provinces. Se generally Uniform CourtJurisdiction
and Proceedings Transfer Act, UNIF . CONF. OF CANADA, available at
http://www.ulcc.ca/cn/uniforii-acts-en-gb-1/183-couir-jurisdiction-and-proceedings-
transfer-act. For province specific verisions see Court jurisdiction and Proceedings
Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 28 (Can. B.C.); S.S. 1997, c. C-41.1 (Can. Sask.); S.N.S.
2003 (2nd Sess.), c. 2 (Can. N.S.).
47. Uniform Courtjurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, 7, UN1i. L. CONF.
OF CANADA, available at http://www ulcc.ca/en/uniforrn-acts-en-gb-l/183-court-
jurisdiction-and -proccedings-traisfer-act. Section 7 of the (JPTA provides:
Ordinary residence - corporations
7. A corporation is ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory], for the
purposes of this Part. only if:
(a) the corporation has or is required by law to have a registered office in
[cnacting province of territory];
(b) pursuant to law, it:
(i) has registered an address in [enacting province or territory] at which
process may be served generally; or
(ii) has nominated an agent in [enacting province or territory] upon whom
process may be served generally;
(c) it has a place of business in [cnacting province or territory]; or
(d) its central management is exercised in [Cnacting province or territory].
48. See Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, s. 3148 (Can. Que.). Under section
3148 of the Qu6bec Civil Code. a defendant may always be sued where it is domiciled:
however, it may only be sued where it is resident (where it has "an establishment in
Quebec") provided the "dispute relates to its activities in Quebec."
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"residence" as well, the Court's reasoning on this point is not
entirely clear.49
The Court also noted that, by contrast, the presence of the
plaintiff in the jurisdiction does not create a presumptive
relationship between the forum and either the subject matter of
the litigation or the defendant. The Court here was trying to do
away with the "damage sustained in the forum" ground for
jurisdiction which is characteristic of many of the service exjuris
statutes.51 Some ambiguity arises, however, from the Court's
particular language in this respect. Justice LeBel stated:
The presence of the plaintiff in the jurisdiction is not, on its
own. a sufficient connecting factor. (I will not discuss its
relevance or importance in the context of the forum of
necessity doctrine, which is not at issue in these appeals.)
Absent other considerations, the presence of the plaintiff in the
jurisdiction will not create a presumptive relationship
between the forum and either the subject matter of the
litigation or the defendant.51
The expressions "on its own" and "absent other
considerations" suggest that there may be some role for the
residence of the plaintiff within the jurisdictional inquiry.
However, this would be at odds with the Court's insistence that
non-presumptive factors (of which residence of the plaintiff
would be one) cannot be aggregated to create jurisdiction.52
Perhaps the Court simply used the qualified language to carve
out room for the forum of necessity doctrine, which it
references in the same paragraph. In any event, while the choice
of wording may not have been ideal, the point does seem
clear-courts are no longer to consider the residence of the
plaintiff in the jurisdictional inquiry.
49. See also Blom, supra note 19, at 12 ("The reference to head office seems to
suggest that there is general jurisdiction, meaning jurisdiction irrespective of the
nature of the claim, over a corporation with a head office in the province, but Inaybe
only specific jurisdiction- that is, jurisdiction restricted to claims otherwise connected
with the province-as against a corporation that has a branch office or an agent for
service in the province but has its head office clsewhere.").
50. See, e.g., Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990 Reg. 194 Rule 17.02(h)
(Can.).
51. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda. [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 86 (Can.)
(emphasis added).
52. Id. para. 93.
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2. Defendant Carries on Business in the Province
The Court also determined that "carrying on business" in
the jurisdiction should be considered a presumptive connecting
factor. It recognized, however, that the problem lies not in the
statement of the rule, but in its application. The Court was
particularly wary about creating a rule of "universal jurisdiction"
in respect of tort claims." In this regard, the Court emphasized
that active advertising in the jurisdiction, without more, would
not suffice to establish that the defendant was carrying on
business in the jurisdiction. Thus, this factor requires that there
be some sort of actual (and not just virtual) presence in the
jurisdiction, such as "maintaining an office there or regularly
visiting the territory of the particular jurisdiction."54
Notably, to establish the presumptive factor of "carrying on
business," the plaintiff need not initially show that the plaintiffs
cause of action is related to the business that is actually carried
on in the forum. Instead, as long as the defendant is generally
carrying on some business-regardless of whether that business
relates to the alleged tort-the presumptive factor is satisfied.
The onus then falls on the defendant to rebut the presumption
by arguing that the subject matter of the litigation is not related
to the defendant's business activities in the forum. This seems
to have the matter backward.56 If the plaintiff is seeking to sue in
53. Id. para. 87.
54. Id.; see also id. para. 114 ("Moreover, I do not accept that evidence of
advertising in Ontario would be enough to establish a connection. Advertising is often
international, if not global. It is ubiquitous, crossing borders with case. It does not, on
its own, establish a connection between the claim and the forum. If advertising sufficed
to create a connection with a forum, conmercial organizations of a certain size could
be sued in courts evcrywNhere and anywhere in the world. The courts of a victim's place
of residence would possess an alrnost universal jurisdiction over diverse and vast classes
of consumer claims.").
55. See id. para. 96. This appears to be a not insignificant hurdic: "In such a case,
the defendant will bear the burden of negating the presumptive effect of the listed or
new factor and convincing the court that the proposed assumption of jurisdiction
would be inappropriate." Id. para. 81.
56. Blom argues, "In fact, so fundamental is this aspect that one wonders why it
was not expressly built into the connecting factor, rather than being left as something
to be raised by way of rebuttal." Bloin. supra note 19, at 14. Similarly, Black contends
that "it is striking that Club Resorts did not seek to limit the carrying-on-business PCF
[presumptive connecting factor] in a similar fashion [i.e., to situations where the
subject matter of the litigation arose from the business that the defendant was carrying
on in the forum]." Black, supra note 19, at 423.
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tort and is relying on the "carrying on business" presumptive
factor, the onus should be on the plaintiff to establish that the
business activities relate to the underlying cause of action.
Otherwise, this ground of jurisdiction turns into a surrogate for
domicile or residence-based jurisdiction which does, in fact,
create universal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The confusion regarding this factor stems from the fact that
it is a cross-over between general jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction. In the parlance of US law, "general jurisdiction"
exists when an out-of-forum defendant has extensive, systematic
and continuous dealings with the forum, such that the court has
personal jurisdiction in any dispute involving the defendant. In
other words, with general jurisdiction, the defendant is
essentially "at home" in the forum and thus is subject generally
to the jurisdiction of that forum's courts. By contrast, "specific
jurisdiction" arises when the defendant does not have systematic
and continuous dealings with the forum, such that the forum
only has jurisdiction over the defendant in respect of that
defendant's activities in the forum.57 Canadian courts have
generally eschewed the labels of "general" and "specific"
jurisdiction, but it is clear that the four presumptive factors
articulated in Van Breda do fall into one of the two categories.
The domicile ground of jurisdiction is the classic example of
general jurisdiction. By contrast, the "tort committed in the
jurisdiction" and "contract connected with the dispute made in
the jurisdiction" are examples of specific jurisdiction because
they rely on contacts with the forum related to the particular
dispute at hand. The "carries on business" ground of
jurisdiction looks like a hybrid of general and specific
jurisdiction.58 However, it does not appear that the Supreme
57. See. e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787-90 (2011)
(discussing the differences between general and specific jurisdiction); Goodyear
)unlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); see also Civil Code of
Qu6bec, SQ. 1991, c. 64, s. 3148 (Can. Que.).
58. In the United States, "doing business" in the forul is a ground of general
jurisdiction. Mary Twitchell, 1hy W1"e Keep Doing Business with "Doing Business"
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 172-73 (2001) ("Courts seen to have
articulated a fairly straightfomward standard for doing-business jurisdiction: states have
general jurisdiction over corporations doing continuous and systematic business in the
forum."). Despite the similarity in names, "doing-business" (in the United States) and
1carrying on business" (in Canada) are two very different grounds of jurisdiction. In
the United States, once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant is doing business in
2013] 417
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Court intended "carries on business" to be a ground of general
jurisdiction, as it stressed its concern that this factor should not
turn into a form of universal jurisdiction. Moreover, it
emphasized that the presumption could be rebutted by showing
that the business carried on in the forum had little or nothing to
do with the dispute at hand. Accordingly, it is clear that the
Supreme Court intended for "carries on business" to be a
ground of specific jurisdiction which is only applicable where
the business carried on relates to the underlying tort. However,
the court framed this presumptive factor awkwardly in that the
plaintiff must simply show that the defendant was carrying on
business generally in the forum in order to presumptively
ground jurisdiction (i.e., general jurisdiction), and then the
defendant is entitled to rebut that presumption by showing that
the business conducted in the forum was not related to the
underlying cause of action (i.e., specific jurisdiction). For
conceptual clarity, it would have been much more helpful for
the Court to have identified the presumptive factor as
something to the effect, "The defendant carries on business
related to the underlying tort in the forum province." That way,
the burden would not be on the defendant to rebut the
presumption of jurisdiction after the plaintiff had shown that
the defendant was carrying on some sort of business in the
forum. The burden of establishing this ground of jurisdiction
would be where it properly belongs-on the plaintiff seeking to
fit itself within this presumptive factor.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the "carrying on business"
ground of jurisdiction from Charron shows just how expansively
it is prepared to interpret the term. The Supreme Court
repeated the findings of the courts below that the defendant
had "an active commercial presence in Ontario" and "engaged
in significant commercial activities in Ontario, especially though
the forum, the court has jurisdiction over any claim involving the defendant-even if
the claim is wholly unrelated to its business activities. Id. By contrast, in Canada, after
the plaintifT establishes that the defendant is carrying on business, the defendant has
the opportunity to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction by showing a lack of
connection between the underlying tort and the defendant's business activities in the
forum. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 96 (Can.). Because of
the similarity in nomenciature. however. courts may confuse the "carrying on business"
ground of jurisdiction in Canada and believe tLha it similar to "doing-business"
jurisdiction in the United States.
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the office of the SuperClubs group."59 It then listed the factual
connections that the Court of Appeal relied on in coming to the
conclusion that there existed a real and substantial connection
between the defendant and the forum. In light of all this, the
Court expressed the View that "deference must be shown" to the
courts below, as they were in a position to make findings about
the content and significance of the evidence.6co What is most
notable in this respect is that the Court of Appeal had found
that the evidence "[fell] short of establishing that [the
defendant] was carrying on business in Ontario."' In other
words, the Court of Appeal held that while the defendant was
engaged in significant commercial activities in Ontario, it was
not "carrying on business" in Ontario. And yet, the Supreme
Court ignored the Court of Appeal's conclusion in this respect
and re-weighed the evidence to conclude that the defendant
was, in fact, carrying on business in Ontario.
The list of factors the Supreme Court focused on as
supporting the conclusion that the defendant in Charron was
"carrying on business" in Ontario almost exclusively center
around the defendant's marketing, promotional or advertising
activities in Ontario.62 However, the Supreme Court stated that
"active advertising in the jurisdiction ... [does] not suffice to
establish that the defendant is carrying on business there."6 So,
which is it? Does active advertising in the jurisdiction support
the conclusion that a defendant is carrying on business in
Ontario or not? 4 Based on the Court's factual analysis in
Charron, it is likely safe to assume that extensive advertising in
Ontario, particularly through an Ontario-based intermediary,
59. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 120 (Can.).
60. Id. para. 121.
61. Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd.. 2010 ON(A 84, para. 116 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
62. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 120 (Can.).
63. Id. para. 87 (emphasis added).
64. Perhaps the Supreme Court's conclusion in this respect can be explained by
the fact that advertising in the jurisdiction was effectuated through some form of
physical presence in the jurisdiction. The Court seemed to indicate that "virtual"
presence alone would not suffice to cstablish that the defendant is carrying on business,
but that "actual" presence (through regularly visiting the forum) might suffce to
establish that the defendant is carrying on business there. See id. If this is the case, then
defendants would be wise to structure their affairs so as to only establish a virtual
presence in Ontario (e.g., through email, phone conversations, internet postings).
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will support the conclusion that the defendant is carrying on
business in Ontario.
After determining that the defendant was "carrying on
business" in Ontario within the meaning of the new
jurisdictional rule, the Court then concluded that the defendant
had not rebutted the presumption of jurisdiction that arises
from this connecting factor.65 The Court stated that the
defendant's "business activities in Ontario were specifically
directed at attracting residents of the province, including the
Charron family, to stay as paying guests at the resort in Cuba
where the accident occurred. It cannot be said that the claim
here is unrelated to Club Resorts' business activities in the
province."66 In a very broad sense, the defendant's business
activities are related to the plaintiffs tort cause of action. Had
Club Resorts not promoted its business to Hola Sun and had
Hola Sun not offered packages to Bel-Air Travel, the plaintiffs
might not have purchased this vacation package. Had the
plaintiffs not purchased this vacation package, Mr. Charron
would not have gone scuba diving at this resort and the tort
action would not have ensued. Thus packaged, the plaintiffs
claims are "related" to the defendant's business activities.
However, it is unclear whether this is how the concept of
"related" in respect of "carrying on business" jurisdiction should
be interpreted, particularly if the Court is concerned about
creating a near-universal form ofjurisdiction.
If, for instance, the defendant actively represented in its
literature and to agents in Ontario that its resorts were peanut-
free, a plaintiff purchased a package based on this
representation because he was severely allergic to peanuts, and
the representation turned out to be false, then clearly the
defendant's "business activities" (i.e., its advertising) would be
related to the underlying cause of action. Here, the connection
is much more tenuous. The Court seems to accept that where a
defendant engages in advertising and promotion through an
agent or intermediary, and a plaintiff purchases that product or
65. Id. para. 123. Of course the defendant had not rebutted the presumption. The
presumption is one that was 'just created by the Supremre Court. How could the
defendant have rebutted a presumption that it did not yet know cxisted?
66. Id.
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service, any tort claims that arise from that product or service
are "related to" the defendant's business in Ontario.
The confusion in Charron likely arises from the fact that the
defendant Club Resorts was actually acting in two separate
capacities: first, it advertised and marketed the SuperBreezes
brand in Ontario, and second, it operated and managed the
Cuban resort where Mr. Charron was tragically killed. The cause
of action advanced by the plaintiffs relates to the latter role
assumed by Club Resorts. In other words, the gravamen of the
cause of action in Charron is that Club Resorts was negligent in
failing to ensure, as manager and operator of the resort, that
proper safety procedures were in place for diving expeditions.
This is apparent from the allegations in the Charron Statement
of Claim; all of the allegations center around Club Resorts'
management of the resort and not its marketing activities in
Ontario.67 In fact, the Statement of Claim does not even refer to
Club Resorts as carrying on business in Ontario; instead it notes
that "this Defendant was at all material times the manager and
operator of a resort property known as 'SuperClubs Breezes
Costa Verde.' The defendant was also at all material times the
operator and manager of the said resort's activities and
excursions."8 What is clear is that the plaintiffs in Charron
sought to sue Club Resorts not in respect of its promotional
67. That the tort claim advanced against Club Resorts is based on its management
role (rather than its promotional/marketing rol) is apparent from the Charron Amended
Statement of Claim. At para. 26, the PlaintilTs claim negligence against, inter alia, Club
Resorts based on the following:
They failed to ensure that the proper safety procedures were in place when
conducting diving excursions;
They failed to ensure that they had hired competent staff to train, supervise and
participate in the diving expedition, specifically the dive master and boat captain;
They failed to ensure that the divers participating in the diving expedition had
appropiate experience;
They failed to warn the divers of the potential risks involved in participating in the
diving excursion;
They supplied diving equipment to the divers when they knew or ought to have
known that the equipment did not meet the required safety standards:
They supplied diving equipment when they knew or ought to have known that
such equipment, was not in proper working order;
They failed to ensure that the diving boat was properly equipped and ready for
possible emergencies that could arise out of such a diving accident.
Amended Statement of Clain para. 26, Charron v. Bel Air Travel Group Ltd., 2008
CarswellKn[ 7770 (ONSC), No. 03-B5506.
68. Id. para. 9.
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activities in Ontario (i.e., the business that it carried out in
Ontario), but rather in respect of its operational and
management activities in Cuba.
Jurisdiction should not be assumed on the basis of the
"carrying on business" presumptive factor when the business
that is the subject-matter of the tort claim is not the business
that is carried out in Ontario. In other words, plaintiffs should
not be able to bootstrap claims that are unrelated to defendants'
business activities in Ontario. Otherwise, as discussed above, this
risks turning the "carrying on business" ground of jurisdiction
into the domicile/residence ground of jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, this is exactly what the Supreme Court of Canada
has done in Charyron.
3. Tort Committed in the Province
The Supreme Court in V'an Breda determined that the situs
of a tort should be a presumptive connecting factor for
jurisdictional purposes, noting that "[tflhe difficulty lies in
locating the situs, not in acknowledging the validity of this factor
once the situs has been identified."'W The Court's endorsement
of the situs of the tort as a presumptive connecting factor is
likely to engender much litigation in the future regarding where
exactly certain multi-jurisdictional torts are deemed to occur for
the purpose of the new presumptive factor.70 Plaintiffs will
undoubtedly argue that the tort occurs where the injury is
suffered, as the injury "completes" the tort.1 The Court
foreshadowed this argument with respect to defamation when it
stated, "[flor torts like defamation, sustaining damage
completes the commission of the tort and often tends to locate
69. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 88 (Can.).
70. See, e.g., Central Sun Mining Inc. v. Vector Engineering Inc., [2012] ONSC
7331 ((an. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (alleging that the torts of negligence simpliciter and
negligent misrepresentation in respect of engineering and consultation work
performed by non-Ontario entities were committed in Ontario within the meaning of
the new presumptive factor). As certain commnentators note. " [t] he situs or location of
a tort is itself so uncertain that it can hardly be said to qualify as a presumption at all,
except perhaps in the most obvious cases." Brandon Kain, Elder C. Marques, & Byron
Shaw, Order in the Court? The Van Breda Trilogy-Part 11-A New Test for furisdiction
simnplicte, CANADIAN APPEALS MONITOR (Apr. 26, 2012),
http://www.canadianappeals.com/2012/04/26/orderin-in-the-court-the-van-breda-
trilogy-part-ii-a-new-test-for-jurisdiction-simnpliciter.
71. This would enable many plaintiffs to sue in their home forum.
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the tort in the jurisdiction where the damage is sustained."72
However, as some commentators argue, " [i] t is unclear why the
location of damages in defamation claims should be more
significant than in cases of personal injury."73
One issue which will undoubtedly emerge in coming years
is whether the inquiry into the situs of the tort is the same for
jurisdictional purposes, on the one hand, and choice of law
purposes, on the other. As indicated in Moran v. Pyle, "[t]he
rules for determining situs for jurisdictional purposes need not
be those which are used to identify the legal system under which
the rights and liabilities of the parties fall to be determined." 74
In the absence of guidance on this issue, it is likely that courts
will (rightly or wrongly) rely on choice of law precedent on
identifying the place where the tort occurred in making
jurisdictional determinations.
More fundamentally, locating the situs of the tort seems to
be an overly formalistic approach to jurisdiction. Since Moran,
Canadian courts have moved away from locating the situs of the
tort in jurisdictional determinations. Indeed, Justice Dickson in
Moran discussed the difficulty of ascribing to the tort one single
situs:
Logically, it would seem that if a tort is to be divided and
one part occurs in state A and another in state B. the tort
could reasonably for jurisdictional purposes be said to have
occurred in both states or, on a more restrictive approach,
in neither state. It is difficult to understand how it can
properly be said to have occurred only in state A.75
72. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 89 (Can.).
73. See Kain et al., supra note 70.
74. Moran v. Pyle National (Can.) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, 397 (Can.).
75. Id. at 398. Accordingly, the Court rejected both the "place of acting" and the
place of injuly" approaches advocated by the parties, and instead endorsed the
following rule: "where a foreign defendant carelessly manufactures a product in a
foreign jurisdiction which cntiers into the normal channels of trade and he knows or
ought to know both that as a result of his carelessness a consumer may well be inj ured
and it is reasonably foreseeable that the product would be used or consumed where the
plaintiff used or consumed it, then the forun in which tie plaintiff suffered danage is
entitled to exercise judicial jurisdiction over that foreign defendant .... By tendering
his products in the market place directly or through normal distributive channels, a
manufacturer ought to assume tie burden of defending those products wherever they
cause harm as long as the forum into which the manufacturer is Laken is one that he
reasonably ought to have had in his contemplation when he so tendered his goods.
2013] 423
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In Morguard, Justice La Forest cited the decision in Moran
for the proposition that "it is simply anachronistic to uphold a
power theory or a single situs for torts or contracts for the
proper exercise of jurisdiction."76 And yet, decades later, the
Supreme Court has inexplicably returned to the rigid approach
of locating the situs of the tort in determining judicial
jurisdiction. The consequence of elevating the situs of the tort to
one of four presumptive factors will most certainly be years of
litigation seeking to define where exactly certain multi-
jurisdictional torts are deemed to take place.
4. Contract Connected with the Dispute WV as Made in the
Province
Finally, the Supreme Court determined that, prima facie, a
court is entitled to assume jurisdiction over a dispute where a
"contract connected with the dispute" was made in the forum
province.77 The Court did not expound on this presumptive
factor, other than to say " [c]laims related to contracts made in
Ontario would also be properly brought in the Ontario courts
(rule 17.02(f) (i))."78 To the extent that the Court intended to
derive authority for this presumptive factor from Ontario's
service ex juris rules, this cannot be squared with a plain reading
of Rule 17.02(f) (i). That section provides:
A party to a proceeding may, without a court order, be
sened outside Ontario with an originating process or notice
of a reference where the proceeding against the party
consists of a claim or claims, . . . (f) in respect of a contract
where, (i) the contract was made in Ontario.9
Thus, it is clear that service out of the jurisdiction is
permitted "in respect of a contract" where the contract was
This is particularly true of dangerously defective goods placed in the interprovincial
flow of commerce." Id. at 409.
76. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077. 1109 (Can.).
77. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 90 (Can.). This
should not be confused with consent-based jurisdiction. Consent-based jurisdiction
arises where a party signs a jurisdiction clause/agrecmnent conferring jurisdiction on
the foriun court. Here, the Court is referring to contracts that do not contain
jurisdiction clauses in favor of the forum court (or there would be no need to resort to
the real and substantial connection test).
78. Id. para. 88.
79. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rule 17.02 (Can.).
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made in Ontario.8" That is, if a party is advancing a cause of
action in contract, then an action may be brought in Ontario
where the underlying contract was made in Ontario. This rule
does not speak to whether a tort claim can be maintained where
there exists a contract "connected with the dispute" that was
made in the forum.'
What does it mean for a contract to be "connected with the
dispute" for the purposes of assuming jurisdiction over a
defendant in a tort case?8 2 There are at least two ways in which
80. The rule is similar to Section 10 of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings
Transfer Act:
10 Without limiting the right of the plaintiff to prove other circumstances that
constitute a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or
territory] and the facts on which a proceeding is based, a real and substantial
connection between [enacting province or territory] and those facts is presumed
to exist if the proceeding
(c) concerns contractual obligations, and
(i) the contractual obligations, to a substantial extent, wvere to be performed
in [enacting province or territory],
(ii) by its express terms, the contract is governed by the law of [cnacting
province or territory], or
(iii) the contract
(A) is for the purchase of property, services or both, for use other than in
the course of the purchaser's trade or profession, and
(B) resulted from a solicitation of business in [enacting province or
territory] by o1 on behalf of the seler ....
Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, § 10, UNIF. L. CONE. OF
CANADA, available at http://www ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-en-gb-l,/ 183-court-
jurisdiction-and-proccedings-transfer-act.
81. According to the Court of Appeal, the plaintiffs claim in Van Breda was
friamed in both tort and contract. However, in endorsing presumptive factor (d), the
Court does not make jurisdiction contingent upon a concurrent claim in contract.
Instead, the Court sets out a "contract connected wvith the dispute" being made in
Ontario as providing a basis for jurisdiction in tort. Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd..
2010 ON(A 84, para. 135 ((an. Ont. C.A.).
82. This sentiment is echoed by Olah and Myndiuk, supra note 41 ("Does it mean
that any factual pattern involving a contractual chain having its genesis in Ontario will
now be the subjct to Ontario courts' jurisdiction? Surely this is not what the Supreme
Court of Canada intended."). In Export Packers Co. Ltd. v. SPIInt1 Transp., 2012 ONCA
481, paras. 13-16 (Can. Ont. C.A.). the plaintiff tried arguing that there were three
contracts "connected" with the dispute so as to ground jurisdiction in Ontario. The
Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating, "The three contracts relied upon by
the appellant relate to arrangements between the owner, the broker and the proposed
carrier of the cargo. They have no connection to [the defendant] other than they
anticipate that the cargo wvould be picked up at [the defendant's] warehouse in
Quebec. The dispute in issue between [the plaintiff] and [the defendant] relates solely
to the alleged negligence of [the defendant] in recasing the cargo. The contracts
relied upon do not address the issue of release of the cargo by [the defendant] as
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the "contract connected with a dispute" ground ofjurisdiction is
unclear. First, in cases Where the defendant is a party to a
contract with the plaintiff, how closely must that contract relate
to the underlying cause of action? Second, in cases where the
defendant is not a party to a contract with the plaintiff but there
is nonetheless a contract between the plaintiff and some third
party, can this ground jurisdiction in tort if the subject-matter of
the contract is related to the tort claim?
To illustrate the latter scenario, consider the facts of
Charron. In that case, the plaintiffs entered into a contract with
Hola Sun for a one-week vacation that included scuba diving at
the Cuban resort. The Statement of Claim alleged "that it was a
term of the contract, express or implied, that the late Claude
Charron be provided with safe scuba diving instruction and
equipment, and that the Defendants by their conduct, have
breached the said contract."," However, the Court of Appeal
found that although the defendant, Club Resorts, "was
implicated in the promotion and execution of the contract," it
was not a party to the contract.84 Would the contract between
the plaintiffs and Hola Sun and/or Bel-Air Travel have sufficed
to ground jurisdiction over Club Resorts in respect of a tort
claim that is "connected with the contract"?5 It is not clear how
storer." Id. para. 14. Accordingly, even though there wvere, broadly speaking, contracts
connected" with the dispute involved, the Court of Appeal saw these contracts as too
attenuated to support jurisdiction over a tort claim.
83. Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd., 2010 ONCA 84, para. Ill (Can. Ont. C.A.).
84. Id. para. 113. Thus, the contract did not fall under Rule 17.02(f).
85. In Colavecchia v. The Berkeley Hotel, 2012 ONSC 4747 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.), the court suggested that the answer to this question wvas "no." In that case, the
plaintiff wife booked a hotel stay at a UK hotel through her TD Visa card while she was
in Ontario. At the hotel, the plaintiff husband slipped and fell in the bathiroom of the
hotel room. The court did not believe that presumptive factor (d) applied because it
could not locate a contract between the hotel and the plaintiffs that was made in
Ontario. It readily acknowledged, however. that there was a contract between TD Visa
and the plaintiffs that was made in Ontario. What the court did not consider-and
what it should have considered under Van Breda-is whether this contract between TD
Visa and the plaintiffs constituted a "contract connected with the dispute" within the
meaning of presumptive factor (d). The Colavecchia court also seemed to
misunderstand how the contract between the plaintiffs and the hotel could ground
liability under the Van Breda framework. The court in this respect indicated, "Even if
there was a contract that wvas entered into between the Hotel and the Plaintiffs in
Ontario, it was merely for accommodations. The contract has nothing to do with the
dispute between the parties. which is a classic action for negligence." Id. para. 23. This
statement seems to directly undercut the Supreme Court's ruling in Van Breda itself. In
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the Court intended for related contracts to fit into the
jurisdictional analysis when the plaintiff seeks to establish a
court's jurisdiction over a tort claim.
Like the inquiry into the situs of the tort, this presumptive
factor requires courts to determine where the contract was
made.86 In the V'an Breda case, the answer was straightforward:
since all the parties were physically located in Ontario, the
contract was deemed to be made in Ontario.87 However, in cases
involving cross-border or transnational contracts, the answer
might not be quite as straightforward. Assume, for instance, that
a Club Resorts representative from Cuba had contracted directly
with Mr. Berg (plaintiff Van Breda's travel partner) and that the
two exchanged a series of emails and phone calls. Ultimately,
this culminated in both parties signing a contract prepared by
Club Resorts. Where was the contract made-in Ontario or in
Cuba? Certainly courts have confronted this issue before, both
with respect to the service ex juris rules and the choice of law
Van Breda, the court found that the contract between Mr. Berg and Club Resorts
(though the agent of Mr. Denis) was sufficient to ground Jurisdiction over Ms. Van
Breda's tort clairn in negligence. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda. [2012] 1 S.C.R.
572, para. 23 ((an.) ("I find no reviewable error in the findings that Mr. Denis had the
authority to represent Club Resorts and that a contract existed under which Mr. Berg
was to provide services to Club Resorts. The benefit of this contract, accommodation at
the resort, was extended to Ms. Van Breda, who was injured while there in the context
of Mr. Berg's performance of his contractual obligation. Deference is owed to the
motion judge's findings. No palpable and overriding crror has been established. A
contract was entered into in Ontario and a relationship was thus created in Ontario
between Mr. Berg, Club Resorts and Ms. Van Breda, who was brought within the scope
of this relationship by the terins of the contract."). If the contract between Mr. Berg
and Club Resorts, which included accommodations, was sufficient to ground
jurisdiction over Mr. Berg's travelling companion's claim for negligence, it is hard to
see why the Colavecchia plaintiffs contract with TI) Visa (which provided for
accommodations at the defendant's hotel) would also not be sufficient to ground
jurisdiction. Courts should expect many claims to be brought and argued under factor
(d) since the Supreine Court's ruling was so nebulous on this point.
86. Black argues that "even if some connection between the alleged tort and some
contract justifies tort jurisdiction, the affiliation required here between the contract
and the forum n is a debatable one. Had the PCF [presumptive connecting factor] been
articulated as "a contract that was connected to the tort was to have been substantially
peformed in the jurisdiction," then this PCF would then have rested on a widely
recognised connecting factor for contracts: substantial performance. This ground is
acknowledged in the (JPTA. Place of making, however, is not." Black, supra note
19, at 426.
87. The Court accepted that Mr. Denis was an agent for Club Resorts and Mr.
Denis was located in Ontario. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda. [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572,
paras. I 15-16 (Can.).
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rules in contract. However, elevating this factor to one of only
four presumptive factors for establishing jurisdiction in tort
cases means that determining where a contract is formed takes
on a whole new significance. Much like the search for the situs
of the tort, jurisdiction may now rise and fall on where a court
determines the contract was made.8
These four presumptive factors have essentially become the
"be all and end all" of jurisdictional determinations in Canada.
Given the significance of these four factors, the demarcation of
their boundary lines becomes all the more important: Where
did the tort occur? Does the defendant's conduct amount to
"carrying on business?" Is there a contract that is "connected" to
the dispute that can be used to ground jurisdiction? These will
be the questions at the epicenter of jurisdictional debates in the
years to come.
B. (Irrebuttable) Rebuttable Presumfptions
The Supreme Court explained that each of the four
presumptions is rebuttable and that the burden of rebutting the
presumption rests on the party challenging the assumption of
jurisdiction. That party must establish facts which show that the
"presumptive connecting factor does not point to any real
relationship between the subject matter of the litigation and the
forum or points only to a weak relationship between them.""1
Upon closer analysis, however, it appears that only one of the
presumptions (carrying on business in the jurisdiction) is
actually rebuttable.
It is hard to see how the first presumptive factor (defendant
domiciled in the jurisdiction) could ever be rebutted. The very
nature of this presumptive factor is that it creates a universal
form of jurisdiction based on the defendant's very real and
substantial connection to the forum. Where the defendant is
88. Blorn argues that this presumnptive factor "is vulnerable to the charge of too
much technicality." Blom, supra note 19, at 18. Pointing to the Court's analysis in Vam
Breda, Blon argues that "it seems rather artificial to select the precise manner in which
the plaintiffs stay was originally booked as the critical jurisdictional elenent in a
lawsuit about an injury on a beach in Cuba." Id. Similarly, Black argues that "it is far
fron obvious why, in a torts suit. any affiliations with a contract that is in sorne way
collnected with the tort should be pertinent." Black, supra note 19. at 425.
89. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 95 (Can.).
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domiciled in the forum-i.e., the forum is, in effect, his
"home"-it is difficult to imagine how the presumption can be
rebutted. In fact, the Court stated that "a defendant may always
be sued in a court of the jurisdiction in which he or she is
domiciled or resident."0o More importantly, courts should not
permit the presumption of domicile to be rebutted, as this
would undermine probably the most legitimate and universally-
recognized basis ofjurisdiction simpliciter."1
Vith respect to a tort committed in the jurisdiction, it is
difficult to envisage circumstances where the presumption could
be rebutted. The Court outright acknowledged this when it
stated "where the presumptive connecting factor is the
commission of a tort in the province, rebutting the presumption
ofjurisdiction would appear to be difficult .... "92 The Court then
went on say that it may nonetheless be possible to rebut the
presumption "in a case involying a multi-jurisdictional tort
where only a relatively minor element of the tort has occurred in
the province."' This does not make sense. In order to fall within
the new presumption, the plaintiff must establish that "the tort
was committed in the province"-not that an element of the tort
was committed in the province. If a court is prepared to find
that the forum is the situs of the tort, how could it turn around
and say that only a "relatively minor element" of the tort was
committed in the forum? Presumably, if only a minor element of
the tort was committed in the forum, then the tort itself would
not be deemed to have been committed in the forum.
Similarly, it is unclear how the presumption concerning a
"contract connected with the dispute" can be rebutted. The
Court stated that "where the presumptive connecting factor is a
contract made in the province, the presumption can be rebutted
by showing that the contract has little or nothing to do with the
subject matter of the litigation."94 The Court fails to appreciate
that the presumptive factor it articulated is not simply "a
90. Id. para. 86 (emphasis added).
91. Certainly, a defendant can argue under the forun non conveniens doctrine
that jurisdiction should be declined in favor of another clearly more appropriate
forum.
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contract was made in province" but rather "a contract connected
with the dispute was made in the province." As such, in order to
fall within the presumption, the contract must be connected
with the dispute in some (presumably) significant way. Given
this fact, one cannot rebut the presumption by showing that the
contract has "little or nothing" to do with the dispute; if this
were the case, the presumption would not even apply.
Accordingly, it is difficult to conceive how this factor could be
rebutted.95
The only presumption that can be rebutted is that related
to the defendant carrying on business in the forum. In such
circumstances, it is open to the defendant to argue that the
subject matter of the litigation is unrelated to the defendant's
business activities in the province. As a practical matter, once a
court finds that the defendant is carrying on business in the
forum, and some conceivable link can be made between the
cause of action and those activities, the defendant will have a
very difficult time rebutting the presumption.96
In short, the "rebuttable" presumptions identified by the
Court are, in effect, irrebuttable presumptions. 7 This is evident
when one examines just how quickly the Court concluded that
the presumptions had not been rebutted in the four cases
95. In applying this presumption to the facts of Van Breda, the Court summarily
concluded without any discussion, "Club Resorts has failed to rebut the presumption of
jurisdiction that arises where this factor applies." Id. para. 117.
96. See, e.g., Avanti v. Argex, 2012 ONSC 4395, para. 11 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(after listing reasons why the defendant was carrying on business in Ontario, court
stated "[i t would be open to [dcfcndant] to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction. but
I find that the evidence is not suficient for it to do so."). As argued above, the onus
should be on the plaintiff to establish that the cause of action relates to the business
that is carried on in Ontario. The burden should not be on the defendant to show that
the cause of action has little or nothing to do with the business that is carried on in
Ontario.
97. One author has already expressed concern (albeit in the context of the Court
of Appeal's decision in Van Breda) about courts too readily relying on the
presumptions. See Stephen PitcL Reformulating a Real and Substantial Connection, 60
U.N.B. LJ. 177, 181 (2010) ("In the future, in cases where the defendant secks to rebut
the presumption it would be unfortunate if courts used the presumption as an express
basis for their decisions. The courts should refrain from mcrely concluding that the
factors identified by the defendant are insufficient to rebut the presumned real and
substantial connection."). This is precisely what the Supreme Court of Canada did in
Van Breda/Charron. Black, and Banro. Black notes that in the Context of the (JPTA,
"there has yet to be a reported case where a presumption of R&SC [recal and substantial
connection], once established, has been rebutted." Black, supra note 19, at 424.
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before it. In each case, the Court disposed of the rebuttable
presumptions in a mere sentence or two, without any
meaningful analysis of potential counter-arguments."
Accordingly, it is crucial for defendants to contest vigorously the
application of the presumptive connecting factor, as they are
unlikely have any success displacing the presumption of
jurisdiction that arises once a plaintiff fits himself within one of
the four enumerated factors.
C. Locating New Presuimptive Factors and Aggregating Non-
Presumptive Factors
The Court emphasized that the list of presumptive
connecting factors is not closed." Over time, courts may identify
other connecting factors which should presumptively entitle a
court to assume jurisdiction over a dispute. In deciding whether
a new presumptive factor should be created, courts should look
for connections that are similar to the four already-identified
presumptions. The Court stated that relevant considerations
included:
(a) Similarity of the connecting factor with the recognized
presumptive connecting factors;
98. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda. [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 117 (Can.)
("The existence of a contract made in Ontario that is connected with the litigation is a
presumptive connecting factor that, on its face, entitles the courts of Ontario to assuie
jurisdiction in this case. The events that gave rise to the claim flowed from the
relationship created by the contract. Club Resorts has failed to rebut the presumption
of jurisdiction that arises from the relationship created by this contract."); see also id.
para. 123 ("Club Resorts has not rebutted the presumption of jurisdiction that arises
from this presumptive connecting factor. Its business activities in Ontario were
specifically directed at attracting residents of the province, including the Charron
family, to stay as paying guests at the resort in Cuba where the accident occurred. It
cannot be said that the claim here is unrelated to Club Resorts' business activities in the
province."); Brceden v. Black, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 666. para. 20 (Can.) (" [T]hc
republication in three newspapers of statements contained in press releases issued by
the appellants clearly falls within the scope of this rule. In the circumstances, the
appellants have not displaced the presumption of jurisdiction that results from this
connecting factor."); Editions Ecosoci6te Inc. v. Banro Corp., [2012] 1 S.C.R. 636.
para. 39 (Can.) ("As discussed in Club Resorts, the commission of a tort in Ontario is a
recognized presumptive connecting factor that prima facie entitles the Ontario court to
assunc jurisdiction over this dispute. For the reasons discussed above, the defendants
have not shown that only a minor element of the tort of defamation occurred in
Ontario. As a result, they have not displaced the presumption of jurisdiction that arises
in this case.").
99. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 91 (Can.).
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(b) Treatment of the connecting factor in the case law;
(c) Treatment of the connecting factor in statute law; and
(d) Treatment of the connecting factor in the private
international law of other legal systems with a shared
commitment to order, fairness and comity.0lo
It is hard to imagine that any new presumptive factors will
ever "make the list." Presumably, in selecting and rejecting the
factors it did, the Supreme Court already canvassed connecting
factors from case law and statute law.o'0 In other words, the
Court's decision in Van Breda not to put certain things on the
presumptive factors list must be taken as deliberate.0 2 As such,
litigants would be safe to assume that the presumptive factors
are, for all intents and purposes, closed.
The Court also emphasized that courts are not permitted to
aggregate various non-presumptive factors in order to assume
jurisdiction. 0 The Court believed that this would "open the
100. Id. The Court further noted, "When a court considers whether a new
connecting factor should be given presumptive effect, the values of order, fairness and
comity can serve as useful analytical tools for assessing the strength of the relationship
with a forum to which the factor in question points. These values underlic all
presumptive connecting factors, whether listed or new." Id. para. 92.
101. In Central Sun Mining Inc. v. Vector Engineering Inc., [2012] ONSC 7331
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), the court refused to create a new "breach of contract
committed in the jurisdiction" presumptive factor, emphasizing that "[tihe omission by
the Supreme Court in Van Breda of breach of contract committed in Ontario as a
presumptive factor, suggests it should not be accorded presumptive status under the
jurisdiction simpliciter analysis." Id. para. 87.
102. In Cugalj v. Wick. 2012 ONSC 2407, para. 17 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). the
plaintiff tried arguing that a new presumptive factor should be created because the
insurance company that was defending the action on behalf of the defendant wvas an
Ontario corporation. The Court rejected this argument on various grounds and
ultimately concluded that the "new presumptive factor urged upon me by counsel for
the plaintiffs runs contrary to spirit and stated intention of the Supreme Court of
Canada in its formulation of the new jurisdiction test." Id. para. 18. See also Galaxy
Dragon Ltd. v. Top Water Exclusive Fund IV LLC, 2012 ON(A 382, paras. 1-2 (Can.
Ont. C.A.) ("[Plaintifl] relies on three factors as presumptive or [sic.] assumption of
jurisdiction by Ontario. One recognized in Van Breda and the other two proposed by
the appellant as new presumptive factors. In our view. none of the three are established
here, assuming that the latter two could be considered presumptive in the right case.").
Black suggests that courts will "think twice" about creating new presumptive factors
because they know that once created, these factors will be available in all future cases.
See Black, supra note 19, at 420.
103. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 103 (Can.). In
the first Ontario Court of Appeal decision to refer to this aspect of theI Van Breda
decision, Export Packers Co. Ltd. v. SPI Int'l Transp., 2012 ONCA 481, para. 24 (Can.
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door to assumptions of jurisdictions based largely on the case-by-
case exercise of discretion and would undermine the objectives
of order, certainty and predictability. "1o4 This statement is
consistent with the presumptive factors approach, but it may
result in courts refusing to hear claims that do have objective
factual connections with the jurisdiction. Since the real and
substantial connection operates as both a constitutional limit
and a conflict of laws principle (through the new
presumptions), it is possible for a case to have significant
connections with the jurisdiction so as to satisfy the
constitutional test, but not satisfy the newly-developed conflicts
rule. In other words, there will be cases that operate in the gap
between the constitutional limit of the real and substantial
connection test and the new presumptive rules.
One factor that did not make the Supreme Court's
presumptive factors list in Van Breda derives from Rule 17.02(o),
jurisdiction over "necessary and proper parties." 0 5 The Court of
Appeal in Van Breda had approached this ground of jurisdiction
with trepidation. It relegated Rule 17.02(o) to a non-
presumptive factor, but allowed plaintiffs to argue that on the
facts of a particular case, jurisdiction should be assumed.oo
Under the Supreme Court of Canada's approach, "necessary
and proper parties" is not a presumptive factor.17 This may
result in either the splintering of litigation or the deliberate
(and unwelcome) manipulation of the presumptive factors.
Closely related to the "necessary and proper parties"
ground of jurisdiction is Rule 17 .02(q), which permits service
out of the jurisdiction in respect of claims that are "properly the
Ont. C.A.) the court appeared skeptical of the Supreme Court's holding. The Court of
Appeal stated, "In Van Breda, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have held that if
there are no presumptive connecting factors. courts should not assunle jurisdiction
(paras. 93 and 100). WMether that is the case or not. we agree with the motion judge that in
this case there is not a sufficient real and substantial connection between EDN and
Ontario or between the cause of action asserted against EDN and Ontario to warrant
Ontario accepting jurisdiction." (cmphasis added). It is unclear what the Court of
Appeal meant by the expression " [w]hether that is the case or not."
104. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 93 (Can.).
105. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990. Reg. 194 (Can.).
106. Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd., 2010 ONCA 84, paras. 77-79 (Can. Ont.
CA.).
107. It stands to reason that it will not be a new connecting factor either, since the
Supreme Court was already aware of this factor and chose not to include it on the list.
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subject matter of a counterclaim, cross-claim or third or
subsequent party claim."lo8 In Export Pachers Company Limited v.
SPI In ternational Transportation, the Ontario Court of Appeal had
occasion to consider whether to extend the Supreme Court's
presumptive four factors to encompass third party claims. 0 The
Court of Appeal refused to do so, stating that:
In Van Breda, the Supreme Court of Canada said that
recognition of new presumptive categories should be
focussed primarily on the objective factors that connect the
legal situation or the subject matter of the litigation with the
forum. As the motion judge pointed out, Rule 29 provides a
broad scope for advancing third party claims. The fact that a
foreign party qualifies as a proper subject of a third party
claim is not, by itself, a reliable indicator that there is a real
and substantial connection to support the assertion of
jurisdiction over that foreign party. The test for adding a
party as a third party defendant is not dependent on there
being a factual connection to Ontario.110
The Court of Appeal recognized that there may be some
inefficiencies precipitated by its holding. However, it
emphasized that "potential efficiency should not, in itself, be a
sufficient reason to create a new presumptive category."'
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal took to heart that " [t] here must
be some factual connection to Ontario" to justify the creation of
a new presumptive factor.112 Thus, it appears that Ontario courts
will be very reluctant to deviate from the Supreme Court of
Canada's four presumptive factors. In particular, necessary and
proper parties (to include third party defendants) will not be
108. See Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (Can.); Export
Packers Co. Ltd. v. SPI Int'l Transp., 2011 ONSC 5907, para. 15 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
("Rule 17.02(q) pernits service out of Ontario as of right where the claim is properly
the subject matter of a third party claim under the rules. This is another way of saying
that a third party is a necessary or proper party to the litigation, albeit not as a
defendant but as a third party. Just as Rule 5 provides a 'very generous scope' for the
joinder of parties (as the Court of Appeal noted in Van Breda para. 79), Rule 29
provides a ver y generous scope for the advancement of third party claims. ").
109. Export Packers Co. Ltd. v. SPI Intl1 Transportation. 2012 ON(A 481 (Can.
Ont. C.A.).
110. Id. para. 20.
111. Id. para. 22.
112. Id.
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subject to jurisdiction in Canada absent the application of some
other presumptive factor.
D. Jurisdiction in N\on-Tort Cases
One of the major shortfalls of the Supreme Court's
decision in V'an Breda is that it is uniquely focused on tort claims.
In fact, the Court acknowledged this when it stated that the list
of presumptive factors "does not purport to be an inventory of
connecting factors covering conditions for the assumption of
jurisdiction over all claims known to the law." 1  So how are
those jurisdictional claims to be decided?l14 Unfortunately, the
Court endorsed a framework that was so tort-specific that parties
and courts will be left guessing on how to approach a non-tort
case. Are courts simply to use the service ex juris rules as
presumptive factors for claims involving property, contracts,
restitution, and the like? Or, are courts supposed to craft
presumptive factors in other subject areas (such as contract) and
leave open the possibility for new presumptive factors, as the
Court did in Van Breda? Or, do courts simply analyze the factual
connections between the forum and the subject matter of the
litigation devoid of presumptions? That the Court ignored all
the other "claims known to the law" in its jurisdictional analysis
is perhaps the most regrettable part of the Van Breda decision.
The decision is so tort-specific that it fails to provide any
113. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 85 (Can.).
114. For instance, the AIG case was stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision
in Van Breda. See Gray, supra note 18. In that case. a class of plaintiffs sought to sue an
American defendant in respect of trades of shares that occurred on a foreign exchange
under the Ontario Securities Act. Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5
((an.). The Act provides that a responsible issuer includes "any other issuer with a real
and substantial connection to Ontario, any securities of which are publicly traded." See
id. 138. 1. The Van Breda decision provides little guidance on how to interpret the real
and substantial connection in the class context, other than to emphasize that the
analysis should focus on the underlying factual connections with the dispute (not
abstract notions of comity, fairness or efficiency). See generally Andrea Laing & Eric
Morgan, Some Reflections on the "Responsible 1ssuer" Definition andjurisdictional Aspects of
Securities Class Actions, 8 CAN. CLASS ACTION RL. 100 (2012) (discussing the
implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Van Breda on multi-jurisdictional
securities class actions); Sonia Bjorkquist & Mary Paterson, Multijurisdictional Classes:
Does Van Breda Change AnYthing? 3 ONTARIO BAR Assoc. 1, (Dec. 2012) (discussing
applicability of Van Breda framework to out-of-province class members).
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guidance-much less, meaningful guidance-to courts in the
myriad of cases that do not involve tort claims.11
In the post-Van Breda era, it is apparent that courts are not
faring well analytically in applying the Van Breda factors in
contexts outside of tort. In Wang v. Lin,"6 for instance, the court
considered the real and substantial connection test in the
context of the plaintiffs claim for corollary relief under the
Family Law Act.117 The court indicated that the applicable test is
the real and substantial connection test, and proceeded to
outline the four non-exhaustive Van Breda factors for tort cases.
The Court then indicated that " [t] he facts of this case do not
support the existence of a presumptive connecting factor that
would entitle this court to presume jurisdiction." 118 The court
continued by outlining the "relevant" facts:
(a) The Husband does not live in Ontario or carry on
business in Ontario. It is acknowledged by the Wife that the
Husband's business is based entirely in China.
(b) The parties were not married in Toronto. The children
were not born in Ontario.
(c) The parties have not lived together as a married couple
in Ontario since at least August, 2010 and the children have
not ordinarily resided in Ontario since August, 2010 based
on the following facts: [listing facts]."'
The Wang court claims to apply Van Breda, but in reality
makes a decision based on the absence of objective factual
connections to Ontario. This is because the Van Breda factors are
not geared towards, nor particularly helpful in, resolving family
law claims. The Van Breda framework must be modified in the
family law context for the test to make any sense. Relevant
factors might be: Where were the parties married? Where was
the parties' marital domicile? Where were the children born?
These are the inquiries that would presumably be relevant to
claims under provincial family law statutes. However, the
115. See, e.g., Obfgi Chemicals LILCv. Kilani, 2011 ONSC 1636 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.) It is unclear how a case like Obfgi involving an order in aid of foreign proceedings
would be decided under the new real and substantial connection test.
I16. Wang v. Lin, 2012 ONSC 3374 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.J.).
117. See generally Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.
118. Id. para. 13.
119. Id.
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court-while it does consider these factors-says instead that it
is applying the Van Breda tort factors.
Similarly, in Yemec and Rapp v. Atlantic Lottery Corporation,2o
the court applied the Van Breda factors, without modification, to
a claim in restitution. The court recognized in a footnote that
Van Breda established presumptive connective factors for cases
involving torts, but indicated that "this motion proceeded on
the basis that the Van Breda factors also apply to cases involving
claims for restitution."'12 The court did not consider the thorny
issue of whether, or how, any of the four presumptive factors
would need to be modified in light of the cause of action
advanced by the plaintiff. For instance, the "tort committed in
the province" factor would be inapplicable in the restitution
context; instead, a court would likely consider something to the
effect of "whether the defendant was unjustly enriched in the
province" or "whether a benefit was conferred in the province."
It is not clear that the ultimate outcome in Yemec would have
been any different even if the court had altered the Van Breda
framework. The point, however, is that courts appear to be
blindly applying the V an Breda factors in scenarios where it does
not have, or should not have, wholesale applicability.
Further, in Sears Canada Inc. v. C & S Interior Designs Ltd.,1=2
the court purported to extend the V an Breda framework to
claims sounding in contract, stating " [w]hile the Supreme Court
did not expressly extend this reasoning to contractual disputes,
there appears to be no reason that they cannot be applied more
generally."' The court in Sears, however, did not specify how
the framework should apply to contracts. In particular, it did not
indicate how factors (c) ("The tort was committed in the
province") and (d) ("A contract connected with the dispute was
made in the province") would need to be modified where the
plaintiff alleges breach of contract. In fact, the court's analysis of
the Van Breda factors was wholly perfunctory: "The defendants,
for the most part, are domiciled in Alberta and carry on their
business there. The alleged wrongs occurred in Alberta. The
licensing agreements were concluded in Alberta. These
120. Yenec & Rapp v. At. Lottery Corp., 2012 ONSC 4207 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
121. Id. n.4.
122. 2012 ABQB 573.
123. Id. para. 14.
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presumptive connecting factors were not rebutted by C&S." 124 At
some point, courts are going to have to actually grapple with the
problem of how to modify the Van Breda factors so that they
actually make sense in the particular context in which they are
being applied.
In the meantime, one might question whether plaintiffs
who fail to fit themselves within a presumptive factor in tort
might pursue additional or different categories of recovery
(contract, restitution, etc.) in order to move the jurisdictional
analysis away from tort to an area where there might be more
jurisdictional flexibility. That is, given that the Van Breda
framework applies only to tort, plaintiffs might have more
success framing the cause of action as something other than
tort. Once a court assumes jurisdiction on a different basis, the
tort claims can be swept into the claim. In this respect, the Court
stressed that if a connection exists between the defendant and
the action, a court must assume jurisdiction over all aspects of
the case. To require a plaintiff, for instance, to "litigate a tort
claim in Manitoba and a related claim for restitution in Nova
Scotia" would be incompatible with any notion of fairness and
efficiency. 12 One might expect, then, that plaintiffs will attempt
to frame the cause of action in something other than tort in
order to avoid the presumptive factors framework. If jurisdiction
can be established through pure factual connections to the
dispute, then any related tort claims can and will be adjudicated
by the court as well.
E. Concluding Thoughts on the Presumptive Factors Framework
Van Breda will most certainly make it harder for plaintiffs to
sue foreign defendants in Canada. One can test out the theory
that it will be more difficult to establish jurisdiction over foreign
defendants by examining some cases that were recently decided
under the Court of Appeal's reasoning in Muscutt and/or Van
Breda. In Young v. The Home Depot,'2 the Canadian plaintiffs
sued Home Depot U.S.A. in Ontario in respect of a slip and fall
accident that took place in upstate New York. The trial judge
124. Id. para. 18.
125. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 99 (Can.).
126. 2012 ONSC 1971 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.J.).
LAW OFJURISDICTIONIN CANADA
applied the Court of Appeal's decision in an Breda to conclude
that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter and was the most
appropriate forum for the resolution of the action. If the case
had been decided under the Supreme Court of Canada's new
framework for jurisdiction, the result would probably be
different. The case likely does not fit within any of the four
presumptive factors. The only way to conceivably fit the case
within one of the factors would be to argue that Home Depot
(as an organization) carries on business in Canada. 2  The
problem is that Home Depot Canada and Home Depot U.S.A.
are separately incorporated and it is an uphill battle for a
plaintiff to argue that that Home Depot U.S.A., the defendant in
the case, carries on business in Canada. Accordingly, it seems
that an Ontario court would not have jurisdiction on the facts of
Young.
Similarly, in Cardinali v. Strait,'18 the Ontario plaintiff sued
a Michigan defendant in Ontario concerning a car accident that
took place in Michigan. The trial judge found that Ontario had
jurisdiction simpliciter over the action and was the forum
conveniens for the resolution of the dispute. The trial judge
held that the plaintiff had a significant connection to the forum
since she resides in Ontario and received medical treatment in
Ontario; in addition, there would likely be unfairness, in the
form of financial hardship, if the plaintiff were required to
litigate in Michigan. While the court found that the individual
defendants did not have a significant connection to Ontario,
they were somewhat connected to Ontario through their
insurer, a large multi-national corporation. Accordingly, the
court found jurisdiction to be appropriate. Similar to the Young
case, it is unlikely that an Ontario court would have assumed
jurisdiction if the case had been decided under the new Van
Breda framework, as none of the presumptive factors (even
arguably) apply. There was no tort committed in Ontario; there
127. "The plaintiff argues that that store is part of an international organization
which indeed, by way of the internet in the very least, pursues cross-border shoppers
fron Ontario. The plaintiff argues that the court should apply the principle of
flexibility, which would be defeated by a narrow, legalistic interpreLtation of Holme
Depot as only a specific corporation that carries on the operation of stores only within
the USA, in isolation fromt its worldwide operation, including its Ontario Stores." Id.
para. 16.
128. 2010 ONSC 2503 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.J.).
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was no contract connected with the dispute entered into in
Ontario; the American defendants were not carrying on business
in Ontario; and the defendants were not domiciled or resident
in Ontario. Cases like Cardinali and Young will almost certainly
be foreclosed from proceeding in Ontario in the aftermath of
Van Breda.
IV. CLARIFYING FORUM NON COIV ENIENS
The Supreme Court took Van Breda as an opportunity to
make some important pronouncements about the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. First, the court emphasized that a clear
distinction must be drawn between forum non conveniens and
jurisdiction simpliciter. Forum non conveniens is relevant only
when jurisdiction is established; it has no relevance to the
jurisdictional inquiry itself. I Courts had been confusing this
issue to some extent in the aftermath of Muscutt. But given the
new focus on objective connections, the doctrine should now
have a more well-defined role.
Second, the Supreme Court briefly traced the historical
antecedents of the doctrine to conclude that it was intended to
apply only in cases where there is a "clearly" more appropriate
forum somewhere else. 11 In this respect, the Court stated:
The use of the words "clearly" and "exceptionally" should
be interpreted as an acknowledgment that the normal state
of affairs is that jurisdiction should be exercised once it is
properly assumed. . . . The court should not exercise its
discretion in favour of a stay solely because it finds, once all
relevant concerns and factors are weighed, that comparable
forums exist in other provinces or states. It is not a matter of
flipping a coin. 1
129. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 101 (Can.). The
Court also confirmed that the doctrine is one which the court cannot raise sua spontc.
See id. para. 102 ("Once jurisdiction is established, if the defendant does not raise
further objcctions, the litigation proceeds before the court of the forum. The court
cannot decline to exercise its jurisdiction unlcss the defendant invokes forum non
conveniens. The decision to raise this doctrine rests with the parties, not with the court
seized of the clain.").
130. Id. para. 108.
131. Id. para. 109.
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The Court suggested that applying the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in circumstances where the alternative forum is
simply "more appropriate" but not "clearly more appropriate"
would be contrary to the principles of fairness, efficiency and
predictability.' As a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court is
likely correct that a forum non conveniens doctrine with the
qualifier "clearly" is a preferable rule. It ensures that the forum
selected by the plaintiff, which otherwise possesses jurisdiction
over the defendant, is not displaced simply because another
forum is marginally better suited to hear the dispute. In this
respect, the "clearly" rule seems to better accord with access to
justice for the plaintiff. The rule also accords with one of the
underlying goals of private international law-to provide a
certain and predicable framework for resolving disputes.1"
The Court also noted that the word "clearly" does not
appear in the CJPTA.'34 Rather, the CJPTA provides "[a]fter
considering the interests of the parties to a proceeding and the
ends of justice, a court may decline to exercise its territorial
competence in the proceeding on the ground that a court of
another state is a more appropriate forum in which to hear the
proceeding."' 1 Justice LeBel's reasoning regarding the "clearly
more appropriate forum" standard implies that courts
interpreting the CJPTA provisions should, or must, graft the
word "clearly" onto the section.1 36 Vhile that interpretation may
132. Id.
133. In reality, it is likely that Canadian courts are alircady using a "cicarly" nore
appropriate forum standard, even if they do not explicitly say so. It is a fairly rare case
where a Canadian court declines jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds. See,
e.g., Mynerich v. Hampton Inns Inc., 2009 ONCA 281, para. 8 ((an. Ont. C.A.) (court
dismissing personal injury action on forun non convecniens grounds because "[when
all relevant factors are considered, none favour Ontario, two are neutral-the location
of key witnesses and evidence and loss of juridical advantage, and the other four all
favour Qu6bcc").
134. Club Resorts Ltd.v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 108 (Can.).
135. Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, § 11(1), UNiF. L.
CONF. OF CANADA, available at http://www.ucc.ca/cnuniforim-acts-en-gb-1/183-court-
jurisdiction-and-proceedings-transfer-act.
136. Indeed, in the first (JPTA case post-Van Breda to consider this issue, the
court applied a "clearly more appropriate" standard. See JM Food Services Ltd. v.
Canada liusinet Co., 2012 lCSC 862, para. 23 (Can. B.C.) ("It is not disputed that the
burden is on the applicants to show that this court should decline to exercise its
jurisdiction because Ontario is the forum to be preferred. As explained in [ Van Breda],
the applicants must show that Ontario is clearly the more appropriate forum.").
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be preferable, why are legislatures not permitted to adopt a
different iteration of the forum non conveniens test? After all,
Justice LeBel did say that all of his comments about the
"development of the common law principles of the law of
conflicts are subject to provisions of specific statutes and rules of
procedure."' There does not appear to be a constitutional
reason why the forum non conveniens inquiry needs to be
identical from province to province. We must presume that
those jurisdictions that enacted the CJPTA were aware of the
Spiliada and Amchem decisions that initially articulated the
"clearly more appropriate" standard and chose a test that relied
on a slightly different burden of proof.3 Though Van Breda can
be read as suggesting that all provinces must adopt the same
view of the forum non conveniens doctrine, this is not a
constitutional mandate.
Third, the Court clarified that the forum non conveniens
analysis should begin with the defendant identifying "another
forum that has an appropriate connection under the conflicts
rules and that should be allowed to dispose of the action."I"
This entails the defendant showing, "using the same analytical
approach the court followed with respect to the existence of a
real and substantial connection with the local forum" an
alternative forum that could and should adjudicate the action.140
This adds a new element to the forum non conveniens inquiry
that Canadian courts did not previously require. In essence, in
order to be able to assert that the foreign forum is clearly more
appropriate, that forum must have jurisdiction over the
defendant under Canadian standards of jurisdiction. As a
practical matter, this may not be difficult to satisfy, as it is likely
that a court that is alleged to be "clearly more appropriate" than
the domestic forum would likely have some sort of significant
connection to the dispute. However, it is not impossible to
envisage a scenario where the foreign court which is said to be a
clearly more appropriate forum has jurisdiction under its rules,
137. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 68 (Can.).
138. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulkx Ltd.. [1987] 1 A.C. 460 (H.L.) (U.K):
Anchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Comp. Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897
((an.). Both Spiliada and Amchen were cited by the Supreme Court in Van Breda.
139. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 103 (Can.).
140. Id.
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but not under Canadian rules. For instance, under Article 14 of
the Civil Code, courts in France are permitted to assume
jurisdiction in cases where the plaintiff is domiciled or resident
in France.'1' An assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of the
domicile or residence of the plaintiff would not be considered
appropriate by a Canadian court.14 So it appears that where a
French court asserts jurisdiction on a basis recognized in France
(but not in Canada), such that it has the capacity under its rules
to adjudicate the claim, a Canadian court would not even
consider France as a potentially more appropriate forum. It
should not matter whether the foreign court has jurisdiction
under Canadian rules-what should matter is whether the
foreign court has the capacity under its rules to adjudicate the
claim and whether the alternative forum is clearly more
appropriate. As indicated, this particular issue is not likely to
arise often; however, it is a subtle shift in the law of forum non
conveniens for no readily discernible reason.
Finally, a reading of Van Breda alongside Breeden v. Black,
indicates that there is no longer a meaningful role for "loss of
juridical advantage" in the forum non conveniens analysis.14
Justice LeBel describes loss of juridical advantage as "a difficulty
that could arise should the action be stayed in favour of a court
of another province or country."l 44 Most commonly, loss Of
juridical advantage implicates differences in the governing
substantive law, though it could involve differences in
procedural law. 45 Justice LeBel was of the view that the loss of
juridical advantage inquiry may not add a great deal to the
141. CODE C IVIL [C. CIV.] art. 14 (Fr.). See general Kevin M. Clermont & John
R.B. Palmer I, Exorbiantfursdiction, 58 ME. L. REV. 474 (2006).
142. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda. [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 86 ((an.).
143. Notably, the expression "juridical advantage" is absent from the (JPTA and
from the recent formulations of forum non conveniens (see, e.g:, Muscutt v. Courcelles
(2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd., 2010
ONCA 84 (Can. Ont. C.A.)). The concept of juridical advantage does appear to be
encapsulated in the Oppenheim factors, approved by the Quebec Court of Appeal ("the
advantage conferred on the plaintiff by its choice of forum"). See Brceden v. Black,
[2012] 1 S.C.R. 666, para. 25 (Can.).
144. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. Ill (Can.).
145. For instance, in Black, the plaintiff sought to litigate his defamation claim in
Ontario in order to benefit from a lower standard of proof. compared to the "actual
malice" standard he wvould have to prove in the United States.
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jurisdictional analysis.14 6 In this respect, he quoted the Supreme
Court's decision in Amchem: "[a]ny loss of advantage to the
foreign plaintiff must be weighed as against the loss of
advantage, if any, to the defendant in the foreign jurisdiction if
the action is tried there rather than in the domestic forum." 47
This statement appears to undercut the very notion of loss of
juridical advantage by suggesting that the analysis is a
comparative one-i.e., what juridical advantages does the
plaintiff lose in the foreign forum? vs. what juridical advantages
does the defendant lose in the domestic forum?'48 If loss of
juridical advantage is a comparative notion, then the concept
loses all meaning, as the juridical advantage to the plaintiff
always implies a corresponding juridical disadvantage to the
defendant.
Leaving this issue aside, the Court stated that the concept
of juridical advantage is "inconsistent with the principles of
comity" because a focus on juridical advantage "may put too
strong an emphasis on issues that may reflect only differences in
legal tradition which are deserving of respect."'149 The Court
further noted that "[dlifferences should not be viewed
instinctively as signs of disadvantage or inferiority."' 5 The Court
implies that factoring juridical advantages into the forum non
conveniens equation connotes some degree of disrespect for, or
judgment of, foreign legal systems. This seems to carry the
notion of comity a bit too far. By considering the loss ofjuridical
advantage to the plaintiff, the court is not casting aspersions on
the foreign court. It is simply recognizing that, for this plaintifJ
146. Note that there was no reference in the case to "personal" advantage, a
concept that was often addressed alongside juridical advantage. See, e.g., Amchen
Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Comrp. Bd.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, para. 60
(Can.).
147. Id. para. 55. The quote fron Amchem is inapposite as it was nade in reference
to whether a Canadian court should grant an anti-suit injunction in restraint of foreign
proceedings. Thus situated, the quote underscores that thejuridical advantage that the
Court is concerned with is that of the plaintiff in the domestic proceeding (i.e.. the
defendant in the foreign proceeding).
148. That this is the view that the Court endorsed is supported by its analysis in
Black: "Moreover, even if this advantage to Lord Black were taken into account. it
would have to be balanced against the corresponding and very significant juridical
disadvantage that the appellants would face if the trial were to proceed in Ontario."
Breeden v. Black. [2012] 1 S.C.R. 666, para. 35 (Can.).
149. Id. para. 26.
150. Club Resorts Ltd.v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 112 (Can.).
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and in this case, the chosen forum provides the plaintiff with a
benefit that does not exist in the foreign forum. If the Court's
position is that the plaintiff should not be "denied the benefits
of his or her decision to select a forum that is appropriate under
the conflicts rules,"1 51 it would be best to acknowledge that the
juridical advantage that a forum provides is part and parcel of
the plaintiffs forum selection.
The Court in Van Breda further stated that, to the extent
that juridical advantage continues to be relevant in the forum
non conveniens analysis, it must be viewed with particular
caution inter-provincially.'2 In the words of Justice LeBel, "[t]o
use it too extensively . . . might be inconsistent with the spirit
and intent of Morguard and Hunt."15" Thus, one might wonder
whether the loss of juridical advantage is all but a dead letter in
the inter-provincial context.154 In reality, it is unlikely that the
Court's remarks in this respect changed existing law. It is hard
to envision many scenarios where the plaintiff could point to an
element of a provincial forum's rules or law that would actually
amount to a juridical advantage. So it is likely that the V an Breda
Court's statements to this effect do not mark a particularly
significant shift in Canadian law.
The combination of the Van Breda formulation for
jurisdiction and its formulation of forum non conveniens means
that it will be harder for plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction in
Ontario; but once jurisdiction is established, it will be harder for
defendants to persuade a court to decline to exercise that
jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. Indeed, just
as it will be difficult to rebut the four presumptive factors, so too
will it be difficult to convince a court that has jurisdiction
simpliciter that there is a clearly more appropriate forum
somewhere else.
151. Id. para. 109.
152. Id. para. 112.
153. Id.
154. But seeJM Food Servs. Ltd. v. Canada Businet Co. Ltd., 2012 11CSC 862, para.
59 (Can. B.C.) ("I conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the juridical
advantage afforded the applicants under the Wishart Act is the determining factor
persuading me that Ontario is the appropriate forum for this proceeding.").
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V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS: VAN BREDA LEAVES US
HANGING
One would expect that in a judgment that was under
reserve for over a year, ultimately spanned 125 paragraphs, and
was decided alongside two companion cases, the Court would
have clarified how all the pieces of the jurisdictional puzzle fit
together. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court left many pivotal
questions unanswered: How can presence and consent be
reconciled with the real and substantial connection test? Is the
forum of necessity doctrine part of Canadian law? How does the
new framework for jurisdiction apply to enforcement of foreign
judgments? What does the Court's judgment mean, if anything,
for those provinces that have adopted the CJPTA? While these
questions were not squarely raised on the facts of the four cases
before the Court, it would have been preferable for the Court to
present a unified and coherent framework for personal
jurisdiction in Canada.15
A. Presence and Consent as Independent Bases ofJudicialJurisdiction
The Supreme Court confirmed that presence and consent
remain viable bases for adjudicative jurisdiction, independent of
the real and substantial connection test. After discussing the new
connection-based focus of the real and substantial connection
test, Justice LeBel indicated:
However, jurisdiction may also be based on traditional
grounds, like the defendant's presence in the jurisdiction or
consent to submit to the court's jurisdiction, if they are
established. The real and substantial connection test does
not oust the traditional private international law bases for
court jurisdiction.15
Consequently, if a defendant is served with process in the
jurisdiction ("presence") or the defendant consents to being
sued in the jurisdiction through agreement or
155. This is especially true when one considers the kngths that Justice LeBel went
to in order to delineate betwecn the constitutional and private international law
dimensions of the real and substantial connection test (an issue that was also not raised
on the facts of these cases).
156. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 79 (Can.); see also
Breeden v. Black, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 666, para. 19 (Can.).
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attornment/ submission ("consent"), jurisdiction is considered
proper.1 7 This should answer the debate in some of the
scholarship about whether the real and substantial connection
test was intended to subsume the traditional bases ofjurisdiction
or whether those traditional bases continue to exist alongside
the real and substantial connection test. 1
157. Muscutty. Courcelles (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 577, para. 19 (Can. Ont. C.A.)
("There are three ways in which jurisdiction may be asserted against an out-ofp-province
defendant: (1) presence-based jurisdiction; (2) consent-based jurisdiction; and (3)
assumed jurisdiction. Presence-based jurisdiction permits jurisdiction over an extra-
provincial defendant who is physically present within the territory of the court.
Consent-based jurisdiction pernits jurisdiction over an extra provincial defendant who
consents, whether by voluntary submission, attornment by appearance and defence, or
prior agreement to submit disputes to the jurisdiction of the domestic court. Both
bases of jurisdiction also provide bases for the recognition and enforcement of
extraprovinc ial judgments.").
158. There had been some confusion on this point post-Morguard. The Court in
M4orguard suggested that there were three independent grounds upon which a
provincial court could assume jurisdiction over a defendant, such that its judgment
would be enforceable across Canada: a) presence: the defendant was served with an
originating process in the relevant jurisdiction; b) consent: the defendant had
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court; and c) real and substantial connection: there
was some significant nexus between the forun and the action. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v.
De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 ((an.). However, in Beals v. Saldanha. [2003] 3 S.C.R.
416, para. 37 (Can.),justice Major declared that -[a] real and substantial connection
is the overriding factor in the determination of jurisdiction" and that "[t]he presence
of more of the traditional indicia of jurisdiction (attornncnt, agreement to submit.
residence and presence in the foreign jurisdiction) will serve to bolster the real and
substantial connection to the action or parties." See alsoPro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc.,
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 21 (Can.) (referring to "the passage, for the purpose of
establishing jurisdiction over a defendant, from the service or attornment of the
defendant requirement to the real and substantial connection test"). Consequently,
there was some doubt whether presence and consent are independent bases for
jurisdiction, or simply subsumed within the real and substantial connection inquiry. See
Shckhdar v. K&M Eng'g & Consulting Corp., 2006 CarswellOnt 3216 ((an. Ont. C.A.)
('WL) (overruling trial judges holding that consent could not serve as the basis of
jurisdiction in the absence of a real and substantial connection). See also Morgan v.
Guimiond Boats Ltd., [2006] F.C. 370, para. 14 (Can. Fed. CL.) ("More significant still is
the recent adoption of the 'real and substantial connection' test detailed above. Its
effect on the rules relating to attornment ... remains to be determined"); loannides v.
Calvalley Petroleum Inc. [2006] O.J. No. 2995, paras. 11-12 (Can. Ont. Sup. CA. J.)
("The plaintiff argues that Service was [c]ffected on [the defendant] ... in Ontario ...
and that therefore the plaintiff has a prima face right to proceed. . . . The fact that
service was properly made in Ontario ... is not dispositive of, or even relevant to. the
jurisdictional matter."). At least one court post-Van Breda. however, thought it
necessary to consider whether it had jurisdiction, even though the defendant, an
Ontario resident, did not challenge jurisdiction. See Nagra v. Malhotra. 2012 ONSC
4497 (Can. Out. Sup. CA. J.) (proceeding to employ Van Breda framework where
defendant sought a stay on the basis that Vermont was the more appropriate forum).
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Conceptually, however, it is difficult to reconcile the
traditional bases of jurisdiction with the real and substantial
connection as a constitutional imperative. As discussed, Justice
LeBel in Van Breda demarcated between the constitutional
dimension of the real and substantial connection test and the
conflict of laws dimension of the test. He remarked:
The constitutional territorial limits ... are concerned with
setting the outer boundaries within which a variety of
appropriate conflicts rules can be elaborated and applied.
The purpose of the constitutional principle is to ensure that
specific conflicts rules remain within these boundaries and,
as a result, that they authorize the assumption of jurisdiction
only in circumstances representing a legitimate exercise of
the state's power of adjudication.1 59
Otherwise stated, "[t]he purpose of the constitutionally
imposed limits [of the real and substantial connection test] is to
ensure the existence of the relationship or connection needed
to confer legitimacy." 6 Thus, at the constitutional level, the real
and substantial connection test provides an outer limit to courts'
authority such that the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant
is considered legitimate.
In cases where the defendant agrees to suit in a particular
forum (e.g., by signing a jurisdiction agreement or appearing
and arguing the merits of the case), can we say that this falls
within the outer constitutional limit of the real and substantial
connection test? In other words, does consent provide the
requisite degree of connection so as not to run afoul of the
constitutional facet of the real and substantial connection test?
Consider the following hypothetical: A British Columbia seller
and a New York buyer are transacting business. They enter into a
contract which includes a jurisdiction clause that names Ontario
as the exclusive forum for dispute resolution. Neither party has
any connection to Ontario; they have selected Ontario because
it is considered by both parties to be a neutral forum. In such a
case, would consent to the jurisdiction of the Ontario courts be
an appropriate basis for jurisdiction? The Supreme Court of
Canada in Van Breda says "yes."161 However, where does the
159. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 33 (Can.).
160. Id. para. 31.
161. See id. para. 79.
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connection that is required to satisfy the constitutional
dimension of the real and substantial connection test come
from? As Justice LeBel stated, "[the constitutional test] suggests
that the connection between a state and a dispute cannot be
weak or hypothetical. A weak or hypothetical connection would
cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the exercise of state power
over the persons affected by the dispute."162 In the example
above, there is no connection between the parties/dispute and
Ontario, much less "a weak or hypothetical connection." It may
be that by agreeing to confer jurisdiction on an Ontario court,
the parties are thereby creating the connection needed to satisfy
the constitutional dimension of the real and substantial
connection test. That is, the parties are connecting themselves
to Ontario by virtue of their agreement or submission to the
courts of Ontario.
Ultimately, however, this issue may not matter a great deal
with respect to consent as a basis of jurisdiction. Justice LeBel
emphasized that the constitutional dimension of the real and
substantial connection test was designed to ensure "the
legitimacy of the exercise of state power over the persons
affected by a dispute."16 In this respect, the real and substantial
connection can be seen as a means through which to ensure
that courts do not extend their reach beyond constitutionally-
prescribed limits. It would seem that, where the parties consent
to having their disputes heard in a certain forum, one would be
hard-pressed to say that the exercise of state power over such
individuals is not legitimate.
The real problem appears to arise with respect to presence
as the basis of jurisdiction. Presence-based jurisdiction refers to
the idea that if a party is properly served with process while in
the forum, then it is appropriate for the courts of that forum to
assume jurisdiction over him.'64 Courts and commentators have
noted, quite rightly, that this could mean that jurisdiction is
asserted over a defendant who only has a very transient or
temporary presence in the jurisdiction. Indeed, this
phenomenon is sometimes referred to as "tag jurisdiction"
because it allows a plaintiff to "tag" a defendant who is only
162. Id. para. 32.
163. Id.
164. Subject, of course, to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
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temporarily passing through a forum and thereby subject him to
judicial process in that jurisdiction.165 In reality, Canadian courts
have not concerned themselves too much with the potential
unfairness of presence-based jurisdiction-probably because the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is available as a remedy to
mitigate any such unfairness.'66 However, the doctrine of forum
non conveniens is only applicable if the defendant raises the
issue. One would surmise that in at least some cases of tag
jurisdiction, the judgment is rendered in the defendant's
absence (i.e., as a default judgment). In these cases, the
question of whether the forum court has the authority to render
judgment is a critical one. That, of course, raises the ultimate
question: Is pure presence-based jurisdiction consistent with the
constitutional dimension of the real and substantial connection
test? Justice LeBel ducked this issue in Van Breda, simply
affirming the continued viability of the traditional basis of
presence as a ground for jurisdiction. Interestingly, this
conclusion is wholly at odds with Justice LeBel's dissenting
judgment in Beals v. Saldanha, where he stated:
Under the traditional rules, for example, jurisdiction could
be acquired by serving a defendant who was present in the
jurisdiction, even if her presence was only fleeting and was
completely unconnected to the action, and in the absence
of any other factor supporting jurisdiction. . . .
Circumstances such as these may not amount to a real and
substantial connection, and in my view they should not
continue to be recognized as bases for jurisdiction just
because they were under the traditional rules.167
As Justice LeBels statement from Beals intimates, if the real
and substantial connection (as a constitutional stricture) is
intended to provide an outermost limit to a provincial court's
adjudicative power, then it is difficult to understand how
presence can be retained as a basis of jurisdiction. Where one's
connection to the forum is simply that one is temporarily
165. ANET WALKER & JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF IA x § 8.5
11-25 (6th ed. 2005). The most famous English case involving tag jurisdiction is
Maharance of Baroda v. Wildenstein, [1972] 2 All ER 689 (U.K.), where the French
defendant was served with process while temporarily in England watching the horse
races at Ascot.
166. It should be noted that cases of this nature probably do not arise very often.
167. Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, para. 209 (Can.).
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present there, this appears to be the sort of "weak or
hypothetical" connection thatJustice LeBel was referring to in
V'an Breda as "cast[ing] doubt upon the legitimacy of the
exercise of state power over the [defendant]."'68
Presence, however, has a longstanding history in the
common law of jurisdiction. Indeed, the creation of more
modern categories of jurisdiction, such as the real and
substantial connection test and the minimum contacts test, were
developed by analogy to presence-based jurisdiction.'6 Stephen
Pitel outlines four reasons that support jurisdiction based on the
presence of the defendant:
First, it flows from the nature of territorial sovereignty.
Those present within a jurisdiction owe allegiance to the
laws and institutions of that country. For that allegiance to
be properly enforced, those present must be subject to
being sued in the country's courts. Second, it accords with
basic notions of fairness. The defendant's presence is a
meaningful connection between the defendant and the
jurisdiction. The defendant has deliberately chosen to be in
the jurisdiction, and it is not out of line with reasonable
expectations for the court to take jurisdiction based on
presence. Presence is a reliable indicator of the defendant's
ability to defend against claims in that place. Third, it
promotes certainty. Under our law there should be
established circumstances in which the parties to litigation
know that jurisdiction is not in issue. . . . Fourth, jurisdiction
based on presence is subject to the court's discretion to stay
proceedings in favour of a more appropriate forum. We
therefore have a procedural mechanism to guard against
the limited number of problems that rigid assertion of
presence-basedjurisdiction might cause.1 o
168. Club Resorts Ltd.v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 32 (Can.).
169. Burnham v. Super Ct. of Cal., Cnty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604. 619 (1990) ("The
short of the natter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due
process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal systen that define the
due process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' That
standard was developed by analogy to 'physical presence,' and it would be perverse to
say it could now be turned against that touchstone of jurisdiction.").
170. Stephen G. A. Piel & Cheryl D. Dusten. Lost in Transition: Answering the
Questions Raised by the Supreme Court of Canada's New Approach tojurisdiction. 85 CAN. BAR
REV. 61, 69 (2006).
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Pitel acknowledges, however, that presence-based
jurisdiction does have "one potential weakness: its treatment of
temporary presence."1 7 1 He notes that these same arguments for
retaining presence-based jurisdiction still apply to temporary
presence, albeit to a lesser extent.
The issue still remains, though: how can temporary
presence be reconciled with the constitutional dimension of the
real and substantial connection test as outlined by the Supreme
Court in Ian Breda? While the doctrine may have a long-
standing history, Justice LeBels new framework for
conceptualizing jurisdiction wherein the real and substantial
connection test operates as an outermost limit for the
assumption of jurisdiction does not comfortably accommodate
the notion of temporary presence.
The purpose of this section is not to provide a full
exposition of the issues related to presence and consent-based
jurisdiction and how they relate to the constitutional facet of the
real and substantial connection test. However, the Court did
make a clear pronouncement-that " [t] he real and substantial
connection test does not oust the traditional private
international law bases for court jurisdiction"-without
providing any basis for reconciling that pronouncement with its
newly-described worldview of the real and substantial
connection test. Given a statement this important, one would
have expected some effort at reconciling how presence and
consent can be squared with the real and substantial connection
test as an outer limit on a court's adjudicative jurisdiction.
B. Forum of JNecessity: Part of Canadian Law or Not?
One of the most significant aspects of the Ontario Court of
Appeal's decision in Ian Breda was its recognition of the
doctrine of forum of necessity to which a plaintiff may be able to
resort in the event that jurisdiction cannot be established under
the connection-based real and substantial connection test. The
Court of Appeal noted that forum of necessity has emerged as a
significant jurisdictional doctrine since the Muscutt case was
decided, and that support for the doctrine could be found in
171. Id.
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both Canadian and international law.17 Under the doctrine,
courts enjoy a residual discretion to assume jurisdiction in
circumstances where there is no other forum in which the
plaintiff can reasonably seek relief. The forum of necessity
doctrine accepts that there will be exceptional cases where the
real and substantial connection test is not satisfied, but that
concerns for access to justice nonetheless justify the assumption
of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal stressed that the doctrine
should be explicitly acknowledged as an exception to the real
and substantial connection test. The jurisdictional test, in other
words, should not be distorted to accommodate fairness or
access to justice concerns.
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Van Breda
deliberately avoided commenting7s on whether the forum of
necessity doctrine is part of Canadian law, and if so, how that
doctrine should be interpreted. By emphasizing that the issue
was not raised on the facts of these particular cases, the Court
intimated that the doctrine did exist in Canadian jurisprudence,
but that this was not the appropriate time to flesh it out.1 74 In
any event, in the absence of Supreme Court of Canada guidance
on this topic, the Court of Appeal's judgment concerning the
application of the common law forum of necessity doctrine
applies as precedent, at least in Ontario. Moreover, the doctrine
172. Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd., 2010 ONCA 84, para. 54 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
173. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 59 (Can.) ("I
add that the forum of necessity issue is not before this Court in these appeals, and I will
not need to address it here."); id. para. 82 ("Jurisdiction must - irrespective of the
question of forum of necessity, which I will not discuss here - be established primarily
on the basis of objective factors that connect the lkgal situation or the subject matter of
the litigation with the forium.); id. para. 86 ("The presence of the plaintiff in the
jurisdiction is not, on its own, a sufficient connecting factor. (I wvill not discuss its
relevance or importance in the Context of the forum of necessity doctrine, which is not
at issue in these appeals.)): id. para. 100 ("If the court concludes that it lacks
jurisdiction because none of the presumptive connecting factors exist or because the
presumption of jurisdiction that flows fron one of those factors has been rebutted, it
must dismiss or stay the action, subject to the possible application of the forum of
necessity doctrine, which I need not address in these reasons.").
174. This is particularly problematic because it is likely that plaintiffs who are
unable to bring themsclves within one of the four presumptions will increasingly resort
to the forum of necessity doctrine.
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seems to remain intact in most provinces that have adopted the
CJPTA.1 75
If the doctrine continues to exist in Canadian law then one
might wonder whether, given the Court's rigid new presumptive
factors, there will be increased pressure on the forum of
necessity doctrine. 7 To date, courts have been very restrained
in their application of the forum of necessity doctrine, taking
heed of the Court of Appeal's guidance that the doctrine is
intended to apply only in "exceptional circumstances."' 7 7
However, now that courts are much more constrained in their
jurisdictional determinations (through the four presumptive
factors, the inability to aggregate non-presumptive factors, the
difficulty of rebutting the presumptions, and the unlikelihood of
new factors being added to the list), courts might feel compelled
to resort to the forum of necessity doctrine to mete out what
they see as ajust and fair result in jurisdictional determinations.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not take this
opportunity to explain how all the pieces of the jurisdictional
puzzle fit together. As argued above, it is unclear how to
reconcile the traditional bases of jurisdiction (presence and
consent) with the real and substantial connection test as a
175. British Columbia, Saskatchewan. and Nova Scotia have adopted the (JPTA
(or a version thereof). See Court jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, S.B.C.
2003, c. 28 (Can. B.C.); S.S. 1997, c. C-41.1 (Can. Sask.); S.N.S. 2003 (2nd Sess.), c. 2
(Can. N.S.). Note that the Saskatchewan CJPTA does not contain a forun of necessity
provision. It is unclear whether this was deliberate or simply an oversight.
176. Bruce Brooinhall, Extraterritorial Civ Jurisditon: Obstacles and Openings in
Canada, BLOG OF THL EUR. J. OF INTL L. (May 1. 2012),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/extraterritorial-civil-jurisdiction-obstacles-and-openings-in-
canada/#nore-4915 ("One effect of Van Breda's exclusive reliance on the listed criteria
(and any new ones) will be to shift efforts to development [sic.] Canada's
extraterritorial human rights litigation into the area of forum of necessity.'").
177. See, e.g., Van Kessel v. Orsulak, 2010 ONSC 6919 ((an. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(court refused to apply the doctrine for a plaintiff whose cause of action in
Pennsylvania would expire within two weeks, who had yet to secure legal counsel in
Pennsylvania, and who would have incurred higher costs litigating in Pennsylvania);
Elfarnawani v. International Olympic Committee, 2011 ONSC 6784 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.
(court refused to exercise jurisdiction under a forum of necessity theory where there
were practical difficulties associated with the plaintiff litigating in Switzerland, such as
increased Costs of litigation and personal health issues); Jafarzadchahmnadsargoorabi v.
Sabet, 2011 ONSC 5827, para. 73 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.J.) (court refused to utilize the
forum of necessity doctrine for an Iranian plaintiff who wished to litigate in Ontario
rather than Qu6bec, noting that " [t]hc plaintiff here is not without recourse and can
instigate a counterclaim in the Quebec action commenced by the defendant.").
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constitutional principle. It is equally unclear how to reconcile
the doctrine of forum of necessity with the real and substantial
connection test as a constitutional principle. The very nature of
the forum of necessity doctrine is that it only applies when there
is no real and substantial connection with the forum. While no
one would dispute that the underlying purpose of the doctrine
is salutary-i.e., to provide access to justice for claimants who do
not have a forum in which to vindicate their rights-this does
not mean that it can be harmonized with the constitutional
imperatives described by the Supreme Court in Van Breda.1,'
Since the real and substantial connection test acts as a
constitutional constraint on the assumption of jurisdiction, it
may be impossible for a court to assume jurisdiction (and for
other provincial courts to enforce a resultant judgment) absent
the requisite territorial connection. By refusing to comment on
the forum of necessity doctrine in an Breda, the Court avoided
some difficult, but nonetheless critical, questions. If courts
simply do not have the authority to hear matters in which there
is no real and substantial connection to the forum, then the
forum of necessity doctrine is unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court should not have simply left the question for another day;
the issue is part and parcel of the law of personal jurisdiction in
Canada.
C. Judgment Enforcement: The Flipside of the 'urisdictional Coin
Another question raised by Van Breda is what the decision
means for cases involving the enforcement of foreign
judgments. It is a well-established principle in Canadian private
international law that the same real and substantial connection
test that applies for jurisdiction purposes also applies for
178. See Elizabeth Edinger, New British Columbia Legislation: The Court Jurisdiction
and Proceedings Transfer Act; The Enforcement of Canadian judgment and Decrees Act, 39
U.B.C. L REv. 407, 417 (2006) (discussing the constitutional fragility of the forum of
necessity provision in the British Columbia (JPTA: "The fragility arises fron the fact
that territorial competence has been delined so as to satisfy constitutional principles.
How can a British Columbia court validly assune jurisdiction under section 6 of the
Court jurisdiction Act, where the constitutional principle has not been satisfied? And
when jurisdiction is assumed pursuant to section 6, will British Columbiajudgrents be
recognized by other Canadian courts that are not subject to the Enforcement Act and
which, therefore, still require there to have been a real and substantial connection
between the action and British Columbia?").
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enforcement purposes. 179 That is, when a Canadian court is
deciding whether to enforce a judgment rendered by, say, a New
York court, it must decide whether the New Yorl court had
jurisdiction under Canadian rules of jurisdiction. Despite the
recognition of the principle, most courts have not conceptually
aligned jurisdiction simpliciter with jurisdiction for enforcement
purposes. So for the past decade, courts would apply the
Ontario Court of Appeal's Muscutt and/or Van Breda test to
determine whether they had jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant and would apply a different real and substantial
connection test to determine whether to enforce a foreign
judgment.s 0 In short, there has been a disconnect between the
jurisdiction rules and the enforcement rules in Canadian private
international law.
To be sure, part of the reason for this disconnect likely
stemmed from the difficulty of applying the Muscutt or Van
Breda decisions in assessing whether a foreign court
appropriately assumed jurisdiction.18 1 However, the Supreme
179. As justice Leliel stated in Van Breda, "the framework established for the
purpose of determining whether a court has jurisdiction inay have an impact on ... the
recognition o judgments, and vice versa." Justice Leliel also stated that the framework
established for jurisdiction may impact choice of law, though it is less clear how this is
so. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda. [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 16 ((an.).
180. For instance, both CIMA Plastics Corp. v. Sandid Enterp. Ltd., 2011 ONCA
589 (Can. Ont. C.A.) and Monte Cristo Invs. v. Hydroslotter Corp, 2011 ONSC 6011
(Can. Ont. Sup. CA. J.) were decided after the Court of Appeal's decision in Van Breda.
Nonetheless, neither court directly applied the Van Breda approach to jurisdiction (i.e.,
looking at Rule 17 presumptions, then examining evidence which would tend to rebut
the presumption) to the enforcement inquiry. See CIMA Plastics Corp. v. Sandid
Enterp. Ltd., 2011 ONCA 589, para. 15 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (finding a real and substantial
connection where "[t]he litigation was brought by an Illinois company seeking redress
for interference with the payment of an account receivable purchased from another
Illinois company; the account receivable arose from the business carried on at least in
part in Illinois: and the damages were suffered in Illinois."); Monte Cristo Inv. v.
Hydroslotter Corp., 2011 ONSC 6011, para. 23 ((an. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) ("I have no
doubt that there is a real and substantial connection between California and the cause
of action in this matter. The evidence clearly establishes this connection. First, the gas
and oil wells that were the subject matter of the agreements between the parties in this
case are physically located in California. The $500,000 investment that was made by the
plaintiff was in respect of the operation of these very wells. Second, the two written
agreements between the parties, outlining the terms of the investment, essentially
prescribed that disputes between the parties wvould be resolved by resort to the courts
and laws of California.").
181. Muscutt was bound up in fairness, comity, efficiency while 1an Breda (Court
of Appeal) wvas bound up in procedural rules.
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Court of Canada's decision in V'an Breda should be fairly
straightforward to apply in enforcing a foreign tort judgment.
That is, an enforcing court would need to decide whether the
foreign court assumed jurisdiction either on the basis of
presence, consent, or a real and substantial connection (as
defined by the presumptive factors). The only wrinkle is the
rebuttable presumption.182 Presumably, the party resisting
enforcement of the judgment on the basis that the foreign court
does not have jurisdiction has the opportunity (much like a
defendant) to argue that the presumption should be rebutted.
If history is to be any predictor, however, courts will
continue to develop two separate strands of case law on the real
and substantial connection test-one for jurisdiction and one
for enforcement. This is particularly likely given that the Court
was lamentably silent on how the real and substantial
connection test applied outside the tort context.m In the
enforcement context, courts will continue to rely on the
amalgam of factual connections that the Court in Van Breda said
could not be aggregated for the purposes of assuming
jurisdiction over a defendant. If this prediction is correct, then
182. Again, I emphasize that except for "carrying on business" the other factors
would appear to be irrebuttabic.
183. In the irst judgment enforcement decision to be released after the Supreme
Courts decision in Van Breda, the Ontario Court of Appeal did not directly engage in
how to apply the new real and substantial connection test. See Sincies Chiementin
S.p.A. v. King, 2012 ONCA 653 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Instead, the Court of Appeal was of
the view that "[a]lthough parts of the ight-pronged test from Muscutt were jettisoned,
there is really very littlc difference between this court's analysis in Charron Estate and
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Vam Breda with respect to the core factors to
be considered." Id. para. 7. The court then proceeded to conclude that a real and
substantial connection existed between the foreign forrum (Italy) and the defendant on
the basis that the tort of professional negligence was committed in Italy. The most
troubling aspect of the Court of Appeal's decision was its deference to the Italian court
on where the tort was conimitted. The Court stated, "In this case, the Civil Court of
Rome carefully considered, on its own accord because King did not attorn to the
jurisdiction, the question of whether a tort had been committed in Italy. The court
concluded that, with regard to 'extra-contractual action' (i.e., the tort claim), the tort
was committed, and damage resulted, in Italy. In our view, a Canadian court should be
very cautious in its scrutiny of the decision of a foreign court in deerimining whether a
tort has been conitted in its jurisdiction. In short, the Civil Court of Rome is better
placed than us to determine its own laws." Id. paras. 9-10. It is trite law that for
judgment enforcement purposes, a Canadian court must detrimine whether the
foreign court had jurisdiction under Canadian rules of jurisdictLion; this includes
assessing whether, under Canadian law, a tort wvas committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
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Canadian courts will be more liberal in enforcing foreign
judgments than they will be in asserting jurisdiction over foreign
defendants. While some degree of inconsistency may be
inevitable,, 4 it appears odd to have two strands of case law for
the same correlated jurisdictional test.18
D. The Intersection Between Common Law and the CJPTA
The Court indicated that all of its comments regarding the
development of the real and substantial connection test were
"subject to provisions of specific statutes and rules of
procedure."'@ It further stated that provinces are "free to
develop different solutions and approaches, provided that they
abide by the territorial limits of the authority of their legislatures
and their courts."187 Presumably, these statements mean that the
Court's presumptive factors framework does not apply in those
jurisdictions that have enacted the CJPTA and that those
jurisdictions can continue to craft their own common law
version of the real and substantial connection test, consistent
with the broad contours of the Supreme Court's decision in Van
Breda.
The difference between the Supreme Court's new Van
Breda approach to jurisdiction and the CJPTA is notable in at
least one way: the CJPTA does not foreclose the ability of the
plaintiff to argue the existence of a real and substantial
connection notwithstanding his inability to fall within one of the
184. For instance, where a Canadian court has jurisdiction on the basis of the
defendant's presence in the forum, the defendant is able to argue that the court should
decline to exercise that jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
However, where a Canadian courL is called upon to enforce a foreign judginent where
the underlying basis of jurisdiction was the defendant's (perhaps fleeting) presence in
the jurisdiction, it is not permitted to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens. As
such, it must enforce the foreign judgnent based on presence.
185. See Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, para. 42 (Can.).
Technically, there is no constitutional reason why the real and substantial connection
test, as a conflicts rule for the assertion of jurisdiction, need be the sane as the
corresponding rule for the enforcement of foreign judgncnts, so long as both tests fall
within constitutional limits. In other words, one could have a more generous test for
enforcement than for jurisdiction simnpliciter purposes. The point, however, is that it
does not appear that courts are deliberately electing to follow a different test for
judgment enforcement; rather, they are not recognizing that the real and substantial
connection jurisdictional test is intended to be correlative.
186. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 68 (Can.).
187. Id. para. 71.
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enumerated presumptions. Consequently, a plaintiff under the
CJPTA can aggregate several non-presumptive factors in order
to show the existence of a real and substantial connection
between the forum and the subject matter of the dispute. This is
not permitted under the new Van Breda test for jurisdiction.18
This will likely mean that courts in a CJPTA jurisdiction will
assume jurisdiction over a wider range of cases than their
common law counterparts.s18 o This may also encourage forum
shopping by plaintiffs who know that they cannot fit within one
of the four presumptions, but may be able to combine various
non-presumptive factors to establish jurisdiction in a court
subject to the CJPTA. 91
With that said, the difference between a common law and a
CJPTA jurisdiction will likely not be overly significant. Even if a
court in a CJPTA jurisdiction were to combine various non-
presumptive factors to ground jurisdiction, it would have to do
so in a manner consistent with the Court's underlying message
in Van Breda: only objective factual connections are to be
considered in the real and substantial connection inquir.1 i
Thus, the jurisdictional results between common law and CJPTA
provinces should be generally similar, with courts in CJPTA
provinces perhaps assuming jurisdiction in a slightly broader
range of cases.
VI. OPEN SEASON FOR LIBEL TOURISTS
This Article would not be complete without a brief
discussion of what Van Breda and its companion cases mean for
cases involving defamation. In Breeden v. Black, well-known
188. Id. para. 93.
189. Bruce Brooinhall, Extraterritorial Civil Jurisdiction: Obstacles and Openings in
Canada, EJIL: TALK! (May 1, 2012), http://www.cjilalk.org/cxtraterritorial-civil-
jurisdiction-obstacles-and-openings-in-canada ("A second way to evade the Vam Breda
test would be through broader provincial laws, although these (like additional
presunptive criteria beyond the 'Van Breda four') would have to survive scrutiny under
the constitutional wing of the 'real and substantial connection' test.").
190. Black observes that " Club Resorts appears to give ise to a state of affairs where
the provinces with the (JPTA's statutory approach to jurisdiction have a more open-
ended, policy-driven methodology than exists in the newly structured and rigidified
common law" See Black, supra note 19, at 421.
191. Id. (predicting that is likely that the Van Breda decision will have "some
effect" onjudicial interpretation of the (JPTA).
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business mogul Conrad Black sued various defendants for
defamation stemming from the publication of certain allegedly
false statements on a website that was accessible from anywhere
in the world. The defendants were resident primarily in the
United States.19 After reviewing the judicial history and position
of the parties, the Supreme Court conducted a very perfunctory
jurisdictional analysis. It noted that the case was "easily resolved"
on the basis of a presumptive factor-the alleged commission of
a tort in Ontario. It elaborated:
It is well-established in Canadian law that the tort of
defamation occurs upon publication of a defamatory
statement to a third party. In this case, publication occurred
when the impugned statements were read, downloaded and
republished in Ontario by three newspapers. It is also well
established that every repetition or republication of a
defamatory statement constitutes a new publication. The
original author of the statement may be held liable for the
republication where it was authorized by the author or
where the republication is the natural and probable result
of the original publication.'9
With no discussion of the issue, the Court cursorily
concluded that the defendants had not displaced the
presumption that results from the application of this connecting
factor.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the defamation claim in
Editions Ecosocidt Inc. v. Banro Corp. was equally simplistic:
Here, the alleged tort of defamation occurred in Ontario.
Noir Canada was distributed in Ontario. At this stage of the
proceedings, the plaintiff need not show evidence of harm
or that the book was read. The plaintiff need only allege
publication . . . As discussed in Club Resorts, the commission
of a tort in Ontario is a recognized presumptive connecting
factor that prima facie entitles the Ontario court to assume
jurisdiction over this dispute.194
192. One defendant was resident in Ontario. See Brceden v. Black. [2012] 1 S.C.R.
666, para. 8 (Can.).
193. Id. para. 20.
194. Editions Ecosoci6te Inc. v. Banro Corp., [2012] 1. S.C.R. 636, para. 38
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Not surprisingly, the Court then summarily concluded that
the defendants had not rebutted the presumption of
jurisdiction.9
Thus, for the purposes of jurisdiction simpliciter, it is fairly
easy for plaintiffs to assert a defamation claim in Canada. '9 So
long as the plaintiff alleges that a publication occurred in
Ontario, jurisdiction is established.19 Certainly, the defendant
has the right to rebut this presumptive factor and show that, on
the facts of a particular case, there is no real and substantial
connection. However, for reasons discussed above, this will be
difficult to do when the underlying basis of jurisdiction is a tort
committed in the province. Indeed, the Court in both Black and
Banro did not even entertain arguments that the presumption
should be displaced.
Instead, the Supreme Court relegated any arguments about
forum shopping-or "libel tourism" as it has become known-to
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.9 8 And, under the
heightened version of forum non conveniens that it adopted,
the Court concluded that neither of the alternative forums was
clearly more appropriate. If neither Illinois nor Qudbec rose to
the level of being clearly more appropriate, it is hard to envision
any forum ever being clearly more appropriate in a defamation
action. In Banro, for instance, the book in dispute was written
(in French) by Quebec authors, published by a Qu6bec
company, and distributed overwhelmingly in Qu6bec. Of the
nearly 5000 copies of the book printed, only ninety-three were
sold in Ontario (which amounts to less than two percent of the
total number of books printed). Likewise, in Black, the
overwhelming majority of the defendants resided in the United
195. The Court also stated, "For the reasons discassed above, the defendants have not
shown that only a minor ekinent of the tort of defamation occurred in Ontario. As a
result, they have not displaced the presumption of jurisdiction that arises in this case."
Id. para. 39 (emphasis added). The reasons the Court appears to be referring to were
simply the reasons why the tort was deemned to be continitted in Ontario; they were not
reasons explaining why the presumnption was not rebutted.
196. The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of jurisdiction simpliciter in three
paragraphs in Black and four paragraphs in Banro.
197. Banro, 1 S.C.R. para. 3 ("At common law, the tort of defamation crystallizes
upon publication of the libellous material, and publication of the libellous material is
presumed when it is printed in a book. The tort of defamation will thus clystallize in all
jurisdicLions where the book is available").
198. See, e.g., id. para. 36.
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States, the witnesses were located in the United States, the
publication concerned matters that arose in the United States,
there was parallel litigation in the United States, and the
plaintiff was incarcerated in the United States. It is hard to
believe that the United States (in particular, Illinois) would not
be a clearly more appropriate forum.
The Court in both cases seemed to rely heavily on the
choice of law analysis as supporting the conclusion that an
Ontario forum was clearly more appropriate. The Court
concluded that whether one used a traditional lex loci delicti
approach to choice of law, or a rule which applied the law of the
forum where the plaintiff suffered the "most substantial harm to
reputation," either would militate in favor of an Ontario court
assuming jurisdiction.1 " However, it should be noted that both
of these methods of ascertaining the governing law are plaintiff-
focused, which unsurprisingly leads to the conclusion that
forum law applies. The conclusion that forum law applies is then
bootstrapped into supporting the conclusion that Ontario is the
most appropriate forum.2 00 So it would seem that in any case
where Ontario law applies (under either the lex loci or the
"most substantial harm to reputation" approach to choice of
law), it would follow that Ontario is the most appropriate forum.
If this is the case, then Canadian courts will assume jurisdiction
on very tenuous facts (i.e., based on the conclusion that the tort
was committed in Ontario because the material was "published"
there) and then keep the action in Ontario under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens because the choice of law inquiry
points in that direction.
In short, the decisions in Black and Banro are a huge win for
plaintiffs alleging defamation claims. So long as the publication
occurred in Ontario-which is very easily established-it is likely
199. Kain et al. are critical of the Court's decision to raise the possibility of an
alternate choice of law test for defamation claims, without resolving the issue: "At the
very least, if the nation's highest Court decides to raise an issue of whether there
should be a new legal rule, then it ought to resolve it. By reinvigorating the possibility
that another choice of law rule in tort exists beyond the lex loci delicti the Supreme
Court has needlessly introduced the risk of contusion into the Canadian choice of law
paradigm." See Kain et al., supra note 19, at 299.
200. Rain ct al. point out that "LeBelJ.'s judgincnts fail to consider the possibility
that [1c foreign jurisdiction would apply its own choice of law rules in detrminming
which substantive law applies to the claim." Id. at 292.
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that the Ontario court will have jurisdiction and decide to retain
jurisdiction if faced with a forum non conveniens challenge.
CON\CL USION
Van Breda is the most important Canadian decision on
personal jurisdiction in over twenty years. Unfortunately, the
decision provides more questions than answers. Among the
outstanding questions: How is each of the four presumptive
factors to be interpreted? Are the presumptions truly rebuttable?
Will new presumptive factors ever make the list? How does the
real and substantial connection test work in non-tort cases?
What is the status of the forum of necessity doctrine? How can
the traditional bases of jurisdiction-presence and consent-be
reconciled with the real and substantial connection test? How
does this new jurisdictional test impact the enforcement of
foreign judgments? Is the approach to jurisdiction different
under the CJPTA? These are but a few of the questions raised by
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Van Breda. Lower
courts will be tasked with the important job of trying to answer
some of these questions in the months and years to come.
The one question that the Supreme Court in Van Breda did
answer was the following: When can a foreign defendant be
subject to suit in Ontario in respect of a tort claim? The answer
was deceptively simple. A foreign defendant can be subject to
suit in Ontario where: (a) the defendant is domiciled or resident
in Ontario; (b) the defendant carries on business in Ontario; (c)
the tort was committed in Ontario; or (d) there is a contract
connected with the dispute that was entered into in Ontario. As
long as a plaintiff can check one of those boxes, an Ontario
court will have jurisdiction over the dispute-subject to the
defendant rebutting the presumption. In circumstances that fall
outside of these factors, an Ontario court will simply not have
jurisdiction unless a plaintiff can persuade a court to add a new
presumptive factor to the list. Two things are clear from the
Court's new formulation of the jurisdictional test. First, there is
incredible pressure on the four presumptive factors. Plaintiffs
and courts will be tempted to distort and manipulate the factors
to reach a just result, as arguably the Supreme Court itself did in
both Van Breda and Charron. Second, there will be scenarios
where a compelling argument can be made that there is a
2013] 4 63
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legitimate connection between the dispute and Ontario, but
none of the presumptive factors is engaged. In these scenarios,
Canadian courts simply do not have the power under the new
jurisdictional test to assume jurisdiction-subject, perhaps, to
the forum of necessity doctrine. Maybe this is simply the price
that litigants must pay for a jurisdictional test that is-at least on
its face-certain and predictable. Or maybe the Supreme Court,
in its zeal to simplify jurisdictional determinations, went a little
too far in sacrificing fairness for predictability. Only time will
tell.
